Truth-Functional Logic and the Form of a Tractarian Proposition
In this paper I argue against Michael Morris’ claim, that the Tractatus view involves holding that the possibility of truth-functional combination is prior to the possibility for sentential constituents to combine with one another. I provide an alternative interpretation in which I deny the prese...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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he Keele-Oxford-St Andrews Kantian Research Centre (University of Keele)
2022-03-01
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| Series: | Public Reason |
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| Online Access: | https://publicreason.ro/pdfa/165 |
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| _version_ | 1849305009358897152 |
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| author | Oliver Thomas Spinney |
| author_facet | Oliver Thomas Spinney |
| author_sort | Oliver Thomas Spinney |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | In this paper I argue against Michael Morris’ claim, that the Tractatus view involves
holding that the possibility of truth-functional combination is prior to the possibility for
sentential constituents to combine with one another. I provide an alternative interpretation in
which I deny the presence of any distinction in the Tractatus between these two possibilities.
I then turn to Adrian Moore’s ‘disjunctivist’ account of sentencehood, itself inspired by the
Tractatus view. I argue that Moore’s account need not involve a commitment to the kind
of priority Morris describes, and that it need not involve a commitment to transcendental
idealism. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-40b9bab24e4b46d3bc796550ca76b9ca |
| institution | Kabale University |
| issn | 2065-7285 2065-8958 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2022-03-01 |
| publisher | he Keele-Oxford-St Andrews Kantian Research Centre (University of Keele) |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Public Reason |
| spelling | doaj-art-40b9bab24e4b46d3bc796550ca76b9ca2025-08-20T03:55:35Zenghe Keele-Oxford-St Andrews Kantian Research Centre (University of Keele)Public Reason2065-72852065-89582022-03-0113(2)-14(1)13(2)-14(1)101105Truth-Functional Logic and the Form of a Tractarian PropositionOliver Thomas Spinney0Royal Holloway, LondonIn this paper I argue against Michael Morris’ claim, that the Tractatus view involves holding that the possibility of truth-functional combination is prior to the possibility for sentential constituents to combine with one another. I provide an alternative interpretation in which I deny the presence of any distinction in the Tractatus between these two possibilities. I then turn to Adrian Moore’s ‘disjunctivist’ account of sentencehood, itself inspired by the Tractatus view. I argue that Moore’s account need not involve a commitment to the kind of priority Morris describes, and that it need not involve a commitment to transcendental idealism.https://publicreason.ro/pdfa/165wittgensteintractatustruth-functional logicpropositionssentences. |
| spellingShingle | Oliver Thomas Spinney Truth-Functional Logic and the Form of a Tractarian Proposition Public Reason wittgenstein tractatus truth-functional logic propositions sentences. |
| title | Truth-Functional Logic and the Form of a Tractarian Proposition |
| title_full | Truth-Functional Logic and the Form of a Tractarian Proposition |
| title_fullStr | Truth-Functional Logic and the Form of a Tractarian Proposition |
| title_full_unstemmed | Truth-Functional Logic and the Form of a Tractarian Proposition |
| title_short | Truth-Functional Logic and the Form of a Tractarian Proposition |
| title_sort | truth functional logic and the form of a tractarian proposition |
| topic | wittgenstein tractatus truth-functional logic propositions sentences. |
| url | https://publicreason.ro/pdfa/165 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT oliverthomasspinney truthfunctionallogicandtheformofatractarianproposition |