Rational expectations and the Cournot-Theocharis problem
In dynamic models in economics, often “rational expectations” are assumed. These are meant to show that the agents can correctly foresee the result of their own and the other agents' actions. In this paper, it is shown that this cannot happen in a simple oligopoly model with a linear demand fun...
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| Main Author: | Tönu Puu |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Wiley
2006-01-01
|
| Series: | Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society |
| Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/DDNS/2006/32103 |
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