Erotetic Knowledge and Deal-Breaker Propositions
Abstract This paper critically engages with André Abath’s Knowing What Things Are: An Inquiry-Based Approach (2022), which develops an erotetic account of knowledge about what things are. According to Abath, to know what X is, one must know propositions that serve as appropriate answers to the quest...
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| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Universidade Estadual de Campinas
2025-04-01
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| Series: | Manuscrito |
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| Online Access: | http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452025000200404&lng=en&tlng=en |
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| Summary: | Abstract This paper critically engages with André Abath’s Knowing What Things Are: An Inquiry-Based Approach (2022), which develops an erotetic account of knowledge about what things are. According to Abath, to know what X is, one must know propositions that serve as appropriate answers to the question “What is X?” within a given inquiry context. While this view successfully accommodates variations in epistemic demands across contexts, I argue that it overlooks the role of deal-breaker propositions - false claims that fundamentally undermine knowledge ascription, even when surrounded by otherwise accurate information. By introducing the notion of relative essences, I propose an amendment to Abath’s account that accounts for the epistemic weight of these propositions. This refinement strengthens the erotetic view by addressing cases where misleading assertions obstruct knowledge transmission. |
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| ISSN: | 2317-630X |