Counterfactuals, Modal Knowledge, and Understanding
In this essay, I attempt to diagnose and show the importance of a structural problem that affects Williamson’s counterfactual epistemology of modality. First, I provide a general, even if somewhat heuristical, description of the requirements that a realist epistemology of modality must fulfil. The...
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Babeș-Bolyai University
2025-08-01
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| Series: | Studia Universitatis Babeș-Bolyai. Philosophia |
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| Online Access: | https://studia.reviste.ubbcluj.ro/index.php/subbphilosophia/article/view/9462 |
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| author | Mihai RUSU |
| author_facet | Mihai RUSU |
| author_sort | Mihai RUSU |
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In this essay, I attempt to diagnose and show the importance of a structural problem that affects Williamson’s counterfactual epistemology of modality. First, I provide a general, even if somewhat heuristical, description of the requirements that a realist epistemology of modality must fulfil. The requirements are analyzed and used for interpreting various controversial choices that Williamson and other philosophers make when theorizing modal knowledge. I then proceed to explain why a more thorough examination of the integration of Williamson’s view of understanding and of his restrictive epistemology of modality leads to the uncovering of a tension that jeopardizes Williamson’s robust realist tenets. I argue that a similar problem (or perhaps different problems with similar underlying reasons) befalls other realist accounts and show why various extant solutions are insufficient. The paper concludes with a reappraisal of the tasks that modal epistemologists have hitherto ignored or treated only collaterally, which may also be interpreted as a critical analysis of the limits of older and newer conceptions of metaphysical modality.
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| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-3fdf340f21cd4579ae2f2c09a85d104c |
| institution | DOAJ |
| issn | 2065-9407 |
| language | deu |
| publishDate | 2025-08-01 |
| publisher | Babeș-Bolyai University |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Studia Universitatis Babeș-Bolyai. Philosophia |
| spelling | doaj-art-3fdf340f21cd4579ae2f2c09a85d104c2025-08-20T03:06:20ZdeuBabeș-Bolyai UniversityStudia Universitatis Babeș-Bolyai. Philosophia2065-94072025-08-0170210.24193/subbphil.2025.2.03Counterfactuals, Modal Knowledge, and UnderstandingMihai RUSU0https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7112-6987Department of Philosophy, Faculty of History and Philosophy, Babeș-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania. Email: rusu.mihai@ubbcluj.ro In this essay, I attempt to diagnose and show the importance of a structural problem that affects Williamson’s counterfactual epistemology of modality. First, I provide a general, even if somewhat heuristical, description of the requirements that a realist epistemology of modality must fulfil. The requirements are analyzed and used for interpreting various controversial choices that Williamson and other philosophers make when theorizing modal knowledge. I then proceed to explain why a more thorough examination of the integration of Williamson’s view of understanding and of his restrictive epistemology of modality leads to the uncovering of a tension that jeopardizes Williamson’s robust realist tenets. I argue that a similar problem (or perhaps different problems with similar underlying reasons) befalls other realist accounts and show why various extant solutions are insufficient. The paper concludes with a reappraisal of the tasks that modal epistemologists have hitherto ignored or treated only collaterally, which may also be interpreted as a critical analysis of the limits of older and newer conceptions of metaphysical modality. https://studia.reviste.ubbcluj.ro/index.php/subbphilosophia/article/view/9462modal epistemologyrealismmetaphysical modalityphilosophy of languageunderstandingcounterfactuals |
| spellingShingle | Mihai RUSU Counterfactuals, Modal Knowledge, and Understanding Studia Universitatis Babeș-Bolyai. Philosophia modal epistemology realism metaphysical modality philosophy of language understanding counterfactuals |
| title | Counterfactuals, Modal Knowledge, and Understanding |
| title_full | Counterfactuals, Modal Knowledge, and Understanding |
| title_fullStr | Counterfactuals, Modal Knowledge, and Understanding |
| title_full_unstemmed | Counterfactuals, Modal Knowledge, and Understanding |
| title_short | Counterfactuals, Modal Knowledge, and Understanding |
| title_sort | counterfactuals modal knowledge and understanding |
| topic | modal epistemology realism metaphysical modality philosophy of language understanding counterfactuals |
| url | https://studia.reviste.ubbcluj.ro/index.php/subbphilosophia/article/view/9462 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT mihairusu counterfactualsmodalknowledgeandunderstanding |