Does vertical supervision enhance labor productivity? Evidence from China’s central environmental protection inspection
Abstract Vertical supervision is an important institutional arrangement for overcoming the principal-agent problem between central and local governments within political decentralization. This research employs panel data from Chinese A-share listed firms spanning 2012–2019, utilizing the Central Env...
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| Main Authors: | Weimin Xie, Jialu Guo, Hengxin Zhang, Mingxiao Fang |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Springer Nature
2025-05-01
|
| Series: | Humanities & Social Sciences Communications |
| Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-025-04958-x |
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