The Conciliatory View in Peer Disagreement and the Problem of Highly Justified Beliefs
Peer disagreement refers to subjects who are epistemically equivalent or accept being equivalent to each other who then adopt opposing beliefs based on the same evidence. Which epistemic attitude is rational is debatable in the face of sucha conflict. According to the conciliatory approach, the rati...
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Istanbul University Press
2022-07-01
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| Series: | Felsefe Arkivi |
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| Online Access: | https://cdn.istanbul.edu.tr/file/JTA6CLJ8T5/08336D9D419345B4B063D3EF1B972949 |
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| author | Nusret Erdi Elmacı |
| author_facet | Nusret Erdi Elmacı |
| author_sort | Nusret Erdi Elmacı |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Peer disagreement refers to subjects who are epistemically equivalent or accept being equivalent to each other who then adopt opposing beliefs based on the same evidence. Which epistemic attitude is rational is debatable in the face of sucha conflict. According to the conciliatory approach, the rational reaction in a peer disagreement is that the subjects think they have a flaw in themselves and suspend their conflicting beliefs. However, Lackey (2010) opposed the conciliatory thesis that the subject should doubt themself in the case of peer disagreement. According to Lackey, the rational response for a subject with highly justified beliefs would be to look for fault in the other person. Then, the subject may believe that the person who had initially been accepted as epistemically equal would no longer be considered a peer. Therefore, according to Lackey, the conciliatory thesis is erroneous. In response to Lackey’s objection, Christensen (2011) agreed with Lackey with regard to disagreements being about highly justified beliefs but did not feel that this contradicted the conciliatory approach. However, this defense from Christensen raises another problem: In some cases, the subject’s belief that the other person is not a peer yields a result that is inconsistent with the conciliatory view. Therefore, which situations this belief can be preserved despite the conflict needs to be clarified. This article argues that highly justified beliefs do not always provide a justifiable reason for subjects to believe the other person is not their peer. In this way, the study will attempt to show that Christensen’s defense needs to be revised. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-3ae7993d16ea4d7db01d922739fe0a8e |
| institution | OA Journals |
| issn | 2667-7644 |
| language | deu |
| publishDate | 2022-07-01 |
| publisher | Istanbul University Press |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Felsefe Arkivi |
| spelling | doaj-art-3ae7993d16ea4d7db01d922739fe0a8e2025-08-20T02:10:42ZdeuIstanbul University PressFelsefe Arkivi2667-76442022-07-015611312910.26650/arcp.1109833123456The Conciliatory View in Peer Disagreement and the Problem of Highly Justified BeliefsNusret Erdi Elmacı0https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6621-6005Pamukkale Üniversitesi, Denizli, TurkiyePeer disagreement refers to subjects who are epistemically equivalent or accept being equivalent to each other who then adopt opposing beliefs based on the same evidence. Which epistemic attitude is rational is debatable in the face of sucha conflict. According to the conciliatory approach, the rational reaction in a peer disagreement is that the subjects think they have a flaw in themselves and suspend their conflicting beliefs. However, Lackey (2010) opposed the conciliatory thesis that the subject should doubt themself in the case of peer disagreement. According to Lackey, the rational response for a subject with highly justified beliefs would be to look for fault in the other person. Then, the subject may believe that the person who had initially been accepted as epistemically equal would no longer be considered a peer. Therefore, according to Lackey, the conciliatory thesis is erroneous. In response to Lackey’s objection, Christensen (2011) agreed with Lackey with regard to disagreements being about highly justified beliefs but did not feel that this contradicted the conciliatory approach. However, this defense from Christensen raises another problem: In some cases, the subject’s belief that the other person is not a peer yields a result that is inconsistent with the conciliatory view. Therefore, which situations this belief can be preserved despite the conflict needs to be clarified. This article argues that highly justified beliefs do not always provide a justifiable reason for subjects to believe the other person is not their peer. In this way, the study will attempt to show that Christensen’s defense needs to be revised.https://cdn.istanbul.edu.tr/file/JTA6CLJ8T5/08336D9D419345B4B063D3EF1B972949peer disagreementconciliatory viewsecond order evidenceepistemic defeaterrational attitude |
| spellingShingle | Nusret Erdi Elmacı The Conciliatory View in Peer Disagreement and the Problem of Highly Justified Beliefs Felsefe Arkivi peer disagreement conciliatory view second order evidence epistemic defeater rational attitude |
| title | The Conciliatory View in Peer Disagreement and the Problem of Highly Justified Beliefs |
| title_full | The Conciliatory View in Peer Disagreement and the Problem of Highly Justified Beliefs |
| title_fullStr | The Conciliatory View in Peer Disagreement and the Problem of Highly Justified Beliefs |
| title_full_unstemmed | The Conciliatory View in Peer Disagreement and the Problem of Highly Justified Beliefs |
| title_short | The Conciliatory View in Peer Disagreement and the Problem of Highly Justified Beliefs |
| title_sort | conciliatory view in peer disagreement and the problem of highly justified beliefs |
| topic | peer disagreement conciliatory view second order evidence epistemic defeater rational attitude |
| url | https://cdn.istanbul.edu.tr/file/JTA6CLJ8T5/08336D9D419345B4B063D3EF1B972949 |
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