Channel Selection Strategies of Chinese E-Commerce Supply Chains Under Green Governmental Subsidies
In the era of the green digital economy, network platforms as a new form of economic format have gained significant attention from e-commerce companies. This paper intends to address the channel selection strategy for e-commerce enterprises and the coordination of the whole supply chain under the go...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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MDPI AG
2025-03-01
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| Series: | Systems |
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| Online Access: | https://www.mdpi.com/2079-8954/13/3/172 |
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| author | Lingyu Gao Xiaoli Wang Xu Xin |
| author_facet | Lingyu Gao Xiaoli Wang Xu Xin |
| author_sort | Lingyu Gao |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | In the era of the green digital economy, network platforms as a new form of economic format have gained significant attention from e-commerce companies. This paper intends to address the channel selection strategy for e-commerce enterprises and the coordination of the whole supply chain under the government’s green subsidy policy. Game theory is used to analyze the strategy of channel selection based on logistics distribution, e-commerce platform, consumer preference, and green governmental subsidy. The findings are as follows: (1) Self-established logistics cost and platform commission rates are important factors affecting channel selection. With the increase in consumers’ preference for a green economy, consumers are more inclined to choose platform channels. (2) Green governmental subsidies represent an advantageous strategy for the whole supply chain, and under its influence, the Pareto improvement of the supply chain can be realized. (3) Cooperation with other companies using the platform franchise system can maximize the benefits of the supply chain, which also can improve consumer satisfaction and increase the profits of e-commerce enterprises at the same time. In conclusion, a platform franchise contract is proposed to coordinate the supply chain and realize the rapid development of the green economy. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-38ec4feb9cdb4b989a54f4e20e663b3e |
| institution | Kabale University |
| issn | 2079-8954 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2025-03-01 |
| publisher | MDPI AG |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Systems |
| spelling | doaj-art-38ec4feb9cdb4b989a54f4e20e663b3e2025-08-20T03:44:01ZengMDPI AGSystems2079-89542025-03-0113317210.3390/systems13030172Channel Selection Strategies of Chinese E-Commerce Supply Chains Under Green Governmental SubsidiesLingyu Gao0Xiaoli Wang1Xu Xin2School of Logistics, Beijing Wuzi University, Beijing 101149, ChinaSchool of Economics and Management, Tongji University, Shanghai 200092, ChinaSchool of Economics and Management, Tongji University, Shanghai 200092, ChinaIn the era of the green digital economy, network platforms as a new form of economic format have gained significant attention from e-commerce companies. This paper intends to address the channel selection strategy for e-commerce enterprises and the coordination of the whole supply chain under the government’s green subsidy policy. Game theory is used to analyze the strategy of channel selection based on logistics distribution, e-commerce platform, consumer preference, and green governmental subsidy. The findings are as follows: (1) Self-established logistics cost and platform commission rates are important factors affecting channel selection. With the increase in consumers’ preference for a green economy, consumers are more inclined to choose platform channels. (2) Green governmental subsidies represent an advantageous strategy for the whole supply chain, and under its influence, the Pareto improvement of the supply chain can be realized. (3) Cooperation with other companies using the platform franchise system can maximize the benefits of the supply chain, which also can improve consumer satisfaction and increase the profits of e-commerce enterprises at the same time. In conclusion, a platform franchise contract is proposed to coordinate the supply chain and realize the rapid development of the green economy.https://www.mdpi.com/2079-8954/13/3/172channel selectiongame theorygovernment green subsidysupply chain coordination |
| spellingShingle | Lingyu Gao Xiaoli Wang Xu Xin Channel Selection Strategies of Chinese E-Commerce Supply Chains Under Green Governmental Subsidies Systems channel selection game theory government green subsidy supply chain coordination |
| title | Channel Selection Strategies of Chinese E-Commerce Supply Chains Under Green Governmental Subsidies |
| title_full | Channel Selection Strategies of Chinese E-Commerce Supply Chains Under Green Governmental Subsidies |
| title_fullStr | Channel Selection Strategies of Chinese E-Commerce Supply Chains Under Green Governmental Subsidies |
| title_full_unstemmed | Channel Selection Strategies of Chinese E-Commerce Supply Chains Under Green Governmental Subsidies |
| title_short | Channel Selection Strategies of Chinese E-Commerce Supply Chains Under Green Governmental Subsidies |
| title_sort | channel selection strategies of chinese e commerce supply chains under green governmental subsidies |
| topic | channel selection game theory government green subsidy supply chain coordination |
| url | https://www.mdpi.com/2079-8954/13/3/172 |
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