A First-Price Sealed-Bid Asymmetric Auction When Two Bidders Have Respective CRRA and General Utility Functions
We study a first-price auction with two bidders where one bidder is characterized by a constant relative risk aversion utility function (i.e., a concave power function) while the other has a general concave utility function. We establish the existence and uniqueness of the optimal strategic markups...
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| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Wiley
2021-01-01
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| Series: | Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society |
| Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/5592402 |
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| _version_ | 1832561557754609664 |
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| author | Mingming Gong Shulin Liu |
| author_facet | Mingming Gong Shulin Liu |
| author_sort | Mingming Gong |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | We study a first-price auction with two bidders where one bidder is characterized by a constant relative risk aversion utility function (i.e., a concave power function) while the other has a general concave utility function. We establish the existence and uniqueness of the optimal strategic markups and analyze the effects of one bidder’s risk aversion level on the optimal strategic markups of him and his opponent’s, the allocative efficiency of the auction, and the seller’s expected revenue, respectively. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-38c68be80f05467b8a685cd9a85294a6 |
| institution | Kabale University |
| issn | 1026-0226 1607-887X |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2021-01-01 |
| publisher | Wiley |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society |
| spelling | doaj-art-38c68be80f05467b8a685cd9a85294a62025-02-03T01:24:41ZengWileyDiscrete Dynamics in Nature and Society1026-02261607-887X2021-01-01202110.1155/2021/55924025592402A First-Price Sealed-Bid Asymmetric Auction When Two Bidders Have Respective CRRA and General Utility FunctionsMingming Gong0Shulin Liu1School of International Trade and Economics, University of International Business and Economics, Beijing 100029, ChinaSchool of International Trade and Economics, University of International Business and Economics, Beijing 100029, ChinaWe study a first-price auction with two bidders where one bidder is characterized by a constant relative risk aversion utility function (i.e., a concave power function) while the other has a general concave utility function. We establish the existence and uniqueness of the optimal strategic markups and analyze the effects of one bidder’s risk aversion level on the optimal strategic markups of him and his opponent’s, the allocative efficiency of the auction, and the seller’s expected revenue, respectively.http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/5592402 |
| spellingShingle | Mingming Gong Shulin Liu A First-Price Sealed-Bid Asymmetric Auction When Two Bidders Have Respective CRRA and General Utility Functions Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society |
| title | A First-Price Sealed-Bid Asymmetric Auction When Two Bidders Have Respective CRRA and General Utility Functions |
| title_full | A First-Price Sealed-Bid Asymmetric Auction When Two Bidders Have Respective CRRA and General Utility Functions |
| title_fullStr | A First-Price Sealed-Bid Asymmetric Auction When Two Bidders Have Respective CRRA and General Utility Functions |
| title_full_unstemmed | A First-Price Sealed-Bid Asymmetric Auction When Two Bidders Have Respective CRRA and General Utility Functions |
| title_short | A First-Price Sealed-Bid Asymmetric Auction When Two Bidders Have Respective CRRA and General Utility Functions |
| title_sort | first price sealed bid asymmetric auction when two bidders have respective crra and general utility functions |
| url | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/5592402 |
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