A Differential Game of Ecological Compensation Criterion for Transboundary Pollution Abatement under Learning by Doing
This paper studies a stochastic differential game of transboundary pollution abatement between two kinds of ecological compensation and the abatement policy, in which the learning by doing is taken into account. Emission and pollution abatement between upstream and downstream region in the same basi...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Wiley
2020-01-01
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| Series: | Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society |
| Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2020/7932845 |
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| _version_ | 1849693209843728384 |
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| author | Zhigang Chen Rongwei Xu Yongxi Yi |
| author_facet | Zhigang Chen Rongwei Xu Yongxi Yi |
| author_sort | Zhigang Chen |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | This paper studies a stochastic differential game of transboundary pollution abatement between two kinds of ecological compensation and the abatement policy, in which the learning by doing is taken into account. Emission and pollution abatement between upstream and downstream region in the same basin is a Stackelberg game, and the downstream regions provide economic compensation for pollution abatement in the upstream region. We discuss the feedback Nash equilibrium strategies of proportional compensation and investment compensation, and it is found that an appropriate ecological compensation ratio can improve the investment level of pollution abatement in the two regions by accumulating experience in the process of learning by doing. In the long term, the investment compensation mechanism is an effective transboundary pollution abatement measure that can continuously reduce the water pollution stock in the upstream and downstream. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-37fd244be1b34bb78f0e193226c04e4f |
| institution | DOAJ |
| issn | 1026-0226 1607-887X |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2020-01-01 |
| publisher | Wiley |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society |
| spelling | doaj-art-37fd244be1b34bb78f0e193226c04e4f2025-08-20T03:20:29ZengWileyDiscrete Dynamics in Nature and Society1026-02261607-887X2020-01-01202010.1155/2020/79328457932845A Differential Game of Ecological Compensation Criterion for Transboundary Pollution Abatement under Learning by DoingZhigang Chen0Rongwei Xu1Yongxi Yi2Institute of Regional and Urban-Rural Development, Wuhan University, Wuhan, ChinaInstitute of Regional and Urban-Rural Development, Wuhan University, Wuhan, ChinaSchool of Economics, Management & Law, University of South China, Hengyang, ChinaThis paper studies a stochastic differential game of transboundary pollution abatement between two kinds of ecological compensation and the abatement policy, in which the learning by doing is taken into account. Emission and pollution abatement between upstream and downstream region in the same basin is a Stackelberg game, and the downstream regions provide economic compensation for pollution abatement in the upstream region. We discuss the feedback Nash equilibrium strategies of proportional compensation and investment compensation, and it is found that an appropriate ecological compensation ratio can improve the investment level of pollution abatement in the two regions by accumulating experience in the process of learning by doing. In the long term, the investment compensation mechanism is an effective transboundary pollution abatement measure that can continuously reduce the water pollution stock in the upstream and downstream.http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2020/7932845 |
| spellingShingle | Zhigang Chen Rongwei Xu Yongxi Yi A Differential Game of Ecological Compensation Criterion for Transboundary Pollution Abatement under Learning by Doing Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society |
| title | A Differential Game of Ecological Compensation Criterion for Transboundary Pollution Abatement under Learning by Doing |
| title_full | A Differential Game of Ecological Compensation Criterion for Transboundary Pollution Abatement under Learning by Doing |
| title_fullStr | A Differential Game of Ecological Compensation Criterion for Transboundary Pollution Abatement under Learning by Doing |
| title_full_unstemmed | A Differential Game of Ecological Compensation Criterion for Transboundary Pollution Abatement under Learning by Doing |
| title_short | A Differential Game of Ecological Compensation Criterion for Transboundary Pollution Abatement under Learning by Doing |
| title_sort | differential game of ecological compensation criterion for transboundary pollution abatement under learning by doing |
| url | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2020/7932845 |
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