An evolutionary game theory analysis on the environmental impact of discharging Fukushima's nuclear wastewater: International stakeholders and strategic dynamics.
On August 24, 2023, Japan controversially decided to discharge nuclear wastewater from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant into the ocean, initiating intense domestic and global debates. This study employs a mixed-method approach, integrating quantitative evolutionary game theory and qualitati...
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Language: | English |
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Public Library of Science (PLoS)
2025-01-01
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Series: | PLoS ONE |
Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0317419 |
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author | Mingyang Li Han Pengsihua Songqing Zhao Zejun Wang Limin Yang Tongjing Liu |
author_facet | Mingyang Li Han Pengsihua Songqing Zhao Zejun Wang Limin Yang Tongjing Liu |
author_sort | Mingyang Li |
collection | DOAJ |
description | On August 24, 2023, Japan controversially decided to discharge nuclear wastewater from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant into the ocean, initiating intense domestic and global debates. This study employs a mixed-method approach, integrating quantitative evolutionary game theory and qualitative data analysis to explore the strategic dynamics among Japan, other nations, and the Japan Fisheries Association regarding this decision. The data includes international environmental reports and economic statistics, served as the basis for simulating decision-making processes under various legal, economic, and environmental pressures. The evolutionary game theory model is used to predict and analyze three evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS), detailing the transition from the initiation to cessation of wastewater discharge. These strategies highlight the necessity for international cooperation, rigorous scientific research, public education, and effective wastewater treatment methods. This study aims to provide both a theoretical framework and practical guidance to foster a global consensus on nuclear wastewater management, which is vital for marine conservation and sustainable development. |
format | Article |
id | doaj-art-369e0ec045214d4ab94fb5138d552212 |
institution | Kabale University |
issn | 1932-6203 |
language | English |
publishDate | 2025-01-01 |
publisher | Public Library of Science (PLoS) |
record_format | Article |
series | PLoS ONE |
spelling | doaj-art-369e0ec045214d4ab94fb5138d5522122025-02-05T05:32:06ZengPublic Library of Science (PLoS)PLoS ONE1932-62032025-01-01201e031741910.1371/journal.pone.0317419An evolutionary game theory analysis on the environmental impact of discharging Fukushima's nuclear wastewater: International stakeholders and strategic dynamics.Mingyang LiHan PengsihuaSongqing ZhaoZejun WangLimin YangTongjing LiuOn August 24, 2023, Japan controversially decided to discharge nuclear wastewater from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant into the ocean, initiating intense domestic and global debates. This study employs a mixed-method approach, integrating quantitative evolutionary game theory and qualitative data analysis to explore the strategic dynamics among Japan, other nations, and the Japan Fisheries Association regarding this decision. The data includes international environmental reports and economic statistics, served as the basis for simulating decision-making processes under various legal, economic, and environmental pressures. The evolutionary game theory model is used to predict and analyze three evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS), detailing the transition from the initiation to cessation of wastewater discharge. These strategies highlight the necessity for international cooperation, rigorous scientific research, public education, and effective wastewater treatment methods. This study aims to provide both a theoretical framework and practical guidance to foster a global consensus on nuclear wastewater management, which is vital for marine conservation and sustainable development.https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0317419 |
spellingShingle | Mingyang Li Han Pengsihua Songqing Zhao Zejun Wang Limin Yang Tongjing Liu An evolutionary game theory analysis on the environmental impact of discharging Fukushima's nuclear wastewater: International stakeholders and strategic dynamics. PLoS ONE |
title | An evolutionary game theory analysis on the environmental impact of discharging Fukushima's nuclear wastewater: International stakeholders and strategic dynamics. |
title_full | An evolutionary game theory analysis on the environmental impact of discharging Fukushima's nuclear wastewater: International stakeholders and strategic dynamics. |
title_fullStr | An evolutionary game theory analysis on the environmental impact of discharging Fukushima's nuclear wastewater: International stakeholders and strategic dynamics. |
title_full_unstemmed | An evolutionary game theory analysis on the environmental impact of discharging Fukushima's nuclear wastewater: International stakeholders and strategic dynamics. |
title_short | An evolutionary game theory analysis on the environmental impact of discharging Fukushima's nuclear wastewater: International stakeholders and strategic dynamics. |
title_sort | evolutionary game theory analysis on the environmental impact of discharging fukushima s nuclear wastewater international stakeholders and strategic dynamics |
url | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0317419 |
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