On Atheistic Hinges
Over the last couple of decades, philosophers have been drawing on ideas from Wittgenstein’s late work <i>On Certainty</i> in developing an approach to epistemology known as “hinge epistemology.” Hinge epistemology has been of particular interest to philosophers of religion because it co...
Saved in:
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
MDPI AG
2025-07-01
|
| Series: | Religions |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/16/7/870 |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| Summary: | Over the last couple of decades, philosophers have been drawing on ideas from Wittgenstein’s late work <i>On Certainty</i> in developing an approach to epistemology known as “hinge epistemology.” Hinge epistemology has been of particular interest to philosophers of religion because it considers the role that deep commitments to particular propositions may have within epistemic life, arguably mirroring what is seen in some religious traditions. The issue that motivates the present article is whether or to what extent it is helpful to think of forms of atheism as being grounded in hinge commitments. After considering various forms of atheism, this article advances the view that there are some forms of atheism that do exhibit core grounding commitments that may be helpfully interpreted as hinges. In developing this argument, the article considers two case studies of apparent atheistic hinges: the “secular faith” of Martin Hägglund and expressions of atheism one may find in contemporary Chinese society. While many atheistic beliefs are contingent upon still more fundamental epistemic commitments, some forms of atheism may be held strongly or with such a sense of import that interpretation by means of the notion of hinge commitment will be illuminating. |
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 2077-1444 |