Optimal Operation and Financing Decisions in Green Supply Chain with a Capital-Constrained Manufacturer
Capital constraint, immensely existing in practice, became major stressors for manufacturers during the green research and development (R & D) triggered by managers integrating green concept into their business models. Considering the initial capital of a capital-constrained manufacturer, this p...
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| Main Authors: | , , , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Wiley
2021-01-01
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| Series: | Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society |
| Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/7220648 |
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| author | Lijuan Xia Lixin Qiao Xiaochen Ma Yuanze Sun Yongli Li |
| author_facet | Lijuan Xia Lixin Qiao Xiaochen Ma Yuanze Sun Yongli Li |
| author_sort | Lijuan Xia |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Capital constraint, immensely existing in practice, became major stressors for manufacturers during the green research and development (R & D) triggered by managers integrating green concept into their business models. Considering the initial capital of a capital-constrained manufacturer, this paper formulates a Stackelberg game model comprising a manufacturer and a retailer, to discuss the optimal operation and financing decisions under the bank financing channel and trade credit financing channel, to detect the relationship between the manufacturer’s initial capital and green R & D investment, and to find which financing channel is better by comparing the two financing channels when the same initial capital is set. According to the above analysis, the results find that the capital-constrained manufacturer prefers financing only when meeting certain conditions. Furthermore, financing might be detrimental to the manufacturer but always beneficial to the retailer. Especially, under trade credit financing channel, the profit improvement of the retailer is higher than the manufacturer in the same financing channel, which suggests that the retailer has strong internal motivation to cooperate with the manufacturer from the perspective of financing. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-33fb68ab32094406a1bd02ac5b8c68e5 |
| institution | Kabale University |
| issn | 1026-0226 1607-887X |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2021-01-01 |
| publisher | Wiley |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society |
| spelling | doaj-art-33fb68ab32094406a1bd02ac5b8c68e52025-02-03T01:27:01ZengWileyDiscrete Dynamics in Nature and Society1026-02261607-887X2021-01-01202110.1155/2021/72206487220648Optimal Operation and Financing Decisions in Green Supply Chain with a Capital-Constrained ManufacturerLijuan Xia0Lixin Qiao1Xiaochen Ma2Yuanze Sun3Yongli Li4School of Economics and Management, Harbin Institute of Technology, Harbin 150001, ChinaSchool of Economics and Management, Harbin Institute of Technology, Harbin 150001, ChinaBusiness School, China University of Political Science and Law, Beijing 100088, ChinaSchool of Mathematics, Hefei University of Technology, Hefei 230009, ChinaSchool of Economics and Management, Harbin Institute of Technology, Harbin 150001, ChinaCapital constraint, immensely existing in practice, became major stressors for manufacturers during the green research and development (R & D) triggered by managers integrating green concept into their business models. Considering the initial capital of a capital-constrained manufacturer, this paper formulates a Stackelberg game model comprising a manufacturer and a retailer, to discuss the optimal operation and financing decisions under the bank financing channel and trade credit financing channel, to detect the relationship between the manufacturer’s initial capital and green R & D investment, and to find which financing channel is better by comparing the two financing channels when the same initial capital is set. According to the above analysis, the results find that the capital-constrained manufacturer prefers financing only when meeting certain conditions. Furthermore, financing might be detrimental to the manufacturer but always beneficial to the retailer. Especially, under trade credit financing channel, the profit improvement of the retailer is higher than the manufacturer in the same financing channel, which suggests that the retailer has strong internal motivation to cooperate with the manufacturer from the perspective of financing.http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/7220648 |
| spellingShingle | Lijuan Xia Lixin Qiao Xiaochen Ma Yuanze Sun Yongli Li Optimal Operation and Financing Decisions in Green Supply Chain with a Capital-Constrained Manufacturer Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society |
| title | Optimal Operation and Financing Decisions in Green Supply Chain with a Capital-Constrained Manufacturer |
| title_full | Optimal Operation and Financing Decisions in Green Supply Chain with a Capital-Constrained Manufacturer |
| title_fullStr | Optimal Operation and Financing Decisions in Green Supply Chain with a Capital-Constrained Manufacturer |
| title_full_unstemmed | Optimal Operation and Financing Decisions in Green Supply Chain with a Capital-Constrained Manufacturer |
| title_short | Optimal Operation and Financing Decisions in Green Supply Chain with a Capital-Constrained Manufacturer |
| title_sort | optimal operation and financing decisions in green supply chain with a capital constrained manufacturer |
| url | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/7220648 |
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