Constraint Accounts of Laws

In recent work, Adlam (2022b), Chen and Goldstein (2022), and Meacham (2023) have defended accounts of laws that take laws to be primitive global constraints. A major advantage of these accounts is that they're able to accommodate the many different kinds of laws that appear in physical theorie...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Christopher J. Meacham
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Michigan Publishing 2025-04-01
Series:Ergo, An Open Access Journal of Philosophy
Online Access:https://journals.publishing.umich.edu/ergo/article/id/7427/
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Summary:In recent work, Adlam (2022b), Chen and Goldstein (2022), and Meacham (2023) have defended accounts of laws that take laws to be primitive global constraints. A major advantage of these accounts is that they're able to accommodate the many different kinds of laws that appear in physical theories. In this paper I'll present these three accounts, highlight their distinguishing features, and note some key differences that might lead one to favor one of these accounts over the others. I'll conclude by briefly discussing a version of a “constraint” account that I think is especially attractive.
ISSN:2330-4014