L’expérience visuelle est-elle une relation ou une représentation ? Le relationnisme et l’intentionnalisme à l’épreuve des sciences cognitives
The naïve conception of visual experience depicts such experience as a direct, primitive relation between the seeing subject and the object seen. It hinges on an opposition between the visual relation and the mental representation of the object seen in visual imagination or in the vision of images....
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | fra |
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École Normale Supérieure de Lyon
2021-12-01
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| Series: | Astérion |
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| Online Access: | https://journals.openedition.org/asterion/7551 |
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| author | Jérôme Dokic |
| author_facet | Jérôme Dokic |
| author_sort | Jérôme Dokic |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | The naïve conception of visual experience depicts such experience as a direct, primitive relation between the seeing subject and the object seen. It hinges on an opposition between the visual relation and the mental representation of the object seen in visual imagination or in the vision of images. The aim of this article is to suggest that the naïve opposition between relation and representation is still philosophically and scientifically relevant. Two philosophical theories of perception are presented: Relationalism takes up the spirit of the naïve conception by analysing visual experience as a non-representational relation to the object seen, whereas intentionalism rejects the naïve conception as inadequate and considers visual experience to be representational through and through. After introducing a general notion of representation acceptable to both sides, we examine a body of works from cognitive science that can mediate the debate between relationalism and intentionalism. The main argument propounded is that relationalism is compatible with the scientific data at our disposal on the cognitive processes related to vision. Relationalism has an additional philosophical advantage since it allows us to understand how mental representations, including visual ones, can be based on a more direct cognitive relation – in other words, an intrinsically relational one – to the visible world. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-307364eb480c4c7e8ac85eb403a1fbe5 |
| institution | OA Journals |
| issn | 1762-6110 |
| language | fra |
| publishDate | 2021-12-01 |
| publisher | École Normale Supérieure de Lyon |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Astérion |
| spelling | doaj-art-307364eb480c4c7e8ac85eb403a1fbe52025-08-20T01:55:07ZfraÉcole Normale Supérieure de LyonAstérion1762-61102021-12-012510.4000/asterion.7551L’expérience visuelle est-elle une relation ou une représentation ? Le relationnisme et l’intentionnalisme à l’épreuve des sciences cognitivesJérôme DokicThe naïve conception of visual experience depicts such experience as a direct, primitive relation between the seeing subject and the object seen. It hinges on an opposition between the visual relation and the mental representation of the object seen in visual imagination or in the vision of images. The aim of this article is to suggest that the naïve opposition between relation and representation is still philosophically and scientifically relevant. Two philosophical theories of perception are presented: Relationalism takes up the spirit of the naïve conception by analysing visual experience as a non-representational relation to the object seen, whereas intentionalism rejects the naïve conception as inadequate and considers visual experience to be representational through and through. After introducing a general notion of representation acceptable to both sides, we examine a body of works from cognitive science that can mediate the debate between relationalism and intentionalism. The main argument propounded is that relationalism is compatible with the scientific data at our disposal on the cognitive processes related to vision. Relationalism has an additional philosophical advantage since it allows us to understand how mental representations, including visual ones, can be based on a more direct cognitive relation – in other words, an intrinsically relational one – to the visible world.https://journals.openedition.org/asterion/7551relationalismintentionalismcriteria of identitysortal conceptvisual indexation |
| spellingShingle | Jérôme Dokic L’expérience visuelle est-elle une relation ou une représentation ? Le relationnisme et l’intentionnalisme à l’épreuve des sciences cognitives Astérion relationalism intentionalism criteria of identity sortal concept visual indexation |
| title | L’expérience visuelle est-elle une relation ou une représentation ? Le relationnisme et l’intentionnalisme à l’épreuve des sciences cognitives |
| title_full | L’expérience visuelle est-elle une relation ou une représentation ? Le relationnisme et l’intentionnalisme à l’épreuve des sciences cognitives |
| title_fullStr | L’expérience visuelle est-elle une relation ou une représentation ? Le relationnisme et l’intentionnalisme à l’épreuve des sciences cognitives |
| title_full_unstemmed | L’expérience visuelle est-elle une relation ou une représentation ? Le relationnisme et l’intentionnalisme à l’épreuve des sciences cognitives |
| title_short | L’expérience visuelle est-elle une relation ou une représentation ? Le relationnisme et l’intentionnalisme à l’épreuve des sciences cognitives |
| title_sort | l experience visuelle est elle une relation ou une representation le relationnisme et l intentionnalisme a l epreuve des sciences cognitives |
| topic | relationalism intentionalism criteria of identity sortal concept visual indexation |
| url | https://journals.openedition.org/asterion/7551 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT jeromedokic lexperiencevisuelleestelleunerelationouunerepresentationlerelationnismeetlintentionnalismealepreuvedessciencescognitives |