The democracy and substantive justice: instrumental moral justifications of democracy on the example of R.A. Dahl's views
The article examines the most common instrumental moral justifications of democracy. Moral justifications are understood as justifications from the point of view of a certain social ideal, and the instrumental nature of the justifications means that the social ideal differs from democracy, and democ...
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| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | Russian |
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North-Caucasus Federal University
2024-09-01
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| Series: | Современная наука и инновации |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://msi.elpub.ru/jour/article/view/1630 |
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| Summary: | The article examines the most common instrumental moral justifications of democracy. Moral justifications are understood as justifications from the point of view of a certain social ideal, and the instrumental nature of the justifications means that the social ideal differs from democracy, and democracy is justified as a way to achieve it. Three arguments given by Dahl in support of democracy are considered: 1) the people are no less competent in matters of moral truth than any ruling elite; 2) no ruling elite, even knowing moral truth, will put it into practice if it is not controlled by the people; 3) no "elite" can be defined as such by anyone except by the people themselves. All these arguments are criticized by the author of the article. It is concluded that political governance requires a number of virtues and competencies, which are inevitably more developed in some people than in others, and thus the moral validity of universal suffrage is questioned. |
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| ISSN: | 2307-910X |