The Paradox of Unilateralism: Institutionalizing Failure In U.S.-Mexican Drug Strategies
Realism posits that strong states use compulsory power to influence the behavior of weaker ones. If true, then U.S. policy toward Mexico on a key national security issue such as drugs should illustrate that claim and policy outcomes should reflect U.S. preferences. Yet, in exploring a series of bila...
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| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México
2013-12-01
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| Series: | Norteamérica |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://www.revistanorteamerica.unam.mx/index.php/nam/article/view/205 |
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| Summary: | Realism posits that strong states use compulsory power to influence the behavior of weaker ones. If true, then U.S. policy toward Mexico on a key national security issue such as drugs should illustrate that claim and policy outcomes should reflect U.S. preferences. Yet, in exploring a series of bilateral case studies, this article suggests that unilateral U.S. government initiatives do not achieve their specified goals. Rather, we argue that Mexico effectively employs a series of “strangulation strategies.” These derail U.S. initiatives and –under specific conditions– result in institutional agreements that proscribe certain forms of behavior and reduce future U.S. autonomy.
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| ISSN: | 1870-3550 2448-7228 |