Limiting Dynamics for Q-Learning with Memory One in Symmetric Two-Player, Two-Action Games
We develop a method based on computer algebra systems to represent the mutual pure strategy best-response dynamics of symmetric two-player, two-action repeated games played by players with a one-period memory. We apply this method to the iterated prisoner’s dilemma, stag hunt, and hawk-dove games an...
Saved in:
| Main Authors: | J. M. Meylahn, L. Janssen |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Wiley
2022-01-01
|
| Series: | Complexity |
| Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2022/4830491 |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
Similar Items
-
Equilibrium Coalition Structures in Three-Player Symmetric Games
by: Jingyi Shen, et al.
Published: (2025-06-01) -
Learning Deceptive Strategies in Adversarial Settings: A Two-Player Game with Asymmetric Information
by: Sai Krishna Reddy Mareddy, et al.
Published: (2025-07-01) -
Policy Similarity Measure for Two-Player Zero-Sum Games
by: Hongsong Tang, et al.
Published: (2025-03-01) -
Optimal investment game for two regulated players with regime switching
by: Lin Xu, et al.
Published: (2024-12-01) -
Effect of emotion on hawk-dove game for two players with different strength
by: Yajie Gao, et al.
Published: (2025-07-01)