Risk-Averse Evolutionary Game Model of Aviation Joint Emergency Response
We study effects of risk-averse attitude of both participators in aviation joint emergency response on the coevolution of cooperation mechanisms and individual preferences between airport and nonprofit organization. First, based on the current aviation joint emergency mechanism in China, we put forw...
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| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Wiley
2016-01-01
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| Series: | Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society |
| Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2016/9031351 |
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| _version_ | 1849305934359166976 |
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| author | Wei Pan Ying Guo Shujie Liao |
| author_facet | Wei Pan Ying Guo Shujie Liao |
| author_sort | Wei Pan |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | We study effects of risk-averse attitude of both participators in aviation joint emergency response on the coevolution of cooperation mechanisms and individual preferences between airport and nonprofit organization. First, based on the current aviation joint emergency mechanism in China, we put forward two mechanisms to select the joint nonprofit organization, including reputation cooperation and bidding competition. Meanwhile, we consider two preferences including altruism and selfishness. Then we build replicator dynamics equations using the theory of conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) taking risk aversion attitude into account. Finally, we introduce the factor of government and give all participators some suggestions. We show that the risk-averse attitude of the other game participator affects the one participator’s decision and the effects subject to some parameters. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-2ee2c0a3c090477082bbc2d2f3b135b4 |
| institution | Kabale University |
| issn | 1026-0226 1607-887X |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2016-01-01 |
| publisher | Wiley |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society |
| spelling | doaj-art-2ee2c0a3c090477082bbc2d2f3b135b42025-08-20T03:55:16ZengWileyDiscrete Dynamics in Nature and Society1026-02261607-887X2016-01-01201610.1155/2016/90313519031351Risk-Averse Evolutionary Game Model of Aviation Joint Emergency ResponseWei Pan0Ying Guo1Shujie Liao2School of Economics and Management, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, ChinaSchool of Economics and Management, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, ChinaCancer Biology Research Center, Tongji Hospital, Tongji Medical College, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan, Hubei 430030, ChinaWe study effects of risk-averse attitude of both participators in aviation joint emergency response on the coevolution of cooperation mechanisms and individual preferences between airport and nonprofit organization. First, based on the current aviation joint emergency mechanism in China, we put forward two mechanisms to select the joint nonprofit organization, including reputation cooperation and bidding competition. Meanwhile, we consider two preferences including altruism and selfishness. Then we build replicator dynamics equations using the theory of conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) taking risk aversion attitude into account. Finally, we introduce the factor of government and give all participators some suggestions. We show that the risk-averse attitude of the other game participator affects the one participator’s decision and the effects subject to some parameters.http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2016/9031351 |
| spellingShingle | Wei Pan Ying Guo Shujie Liao Risk-Averse Evolutionary Game Model of Aviation Joint Emergency Response Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society |
| title | Risk-Averse Evolutionary Game Model of Aviation Joint Emergency Response |
| title_full | Risk-Averse Evolutionary Game Model of Aviation Joint Emergency Response |
| title_fullStr | Risk-Averse Evolutionary Game Model of Aviation Joint Emergency Response |
| title_full_unstemmed | Risk-Averse Evolutionary Game Model of Aviation Joint Emergency Response |
| title_short | Risk-Averse Evolutionary Game Model of Aviation Joint Emergency Response |
| title_sort | risk averse evolutionary game model of aviation joint emergency response |
| url | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2016/9031351 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT weipan riskaverseevolutionarygamemodelofaviationjointemergencyresponse AT yingguo riskaverseevolutionarygamemodelofaviationjointemergencyresponse AT shujieliao riskaverseevolutionarygamemodelofaviationjointemergencyresponse |