Cruel Intentions and Evil Deeds

What it means for an action to have moral worth, and what is required for this to be the case, is the subject of continued controversy. Some argue that an agent performs a morally worthy action if and only if they do it because the action is morally right. Others argue that a morally worthy action i...

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Main Authors: Eyal Tal, Hannah Tierney
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Michigan Publishing 2023-03-01
Series:Ergo, An Open Access Journal of Philosophy
Online Access:https://journals.publishing.umich.edu/ergo/article/id/2621/
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author Eyal Tal
Hannah Tierney
author_facet Eyal Tal
Hannah Tierney
author_sort Eyal Tal
collection DOAJ
description What it means for an action to have moral worth, and what is required for this to be the case, is the subject of continued controversy. Some argue that an agent performs a morally worthy action if and only if they do it because the action is morally right. Others argue that a morally worthy action is that which an agent performs because of features that make the action right. These theorists, though they oppose one another, share something important in common. They focus almost exclusively on the moral worth of right actions. But there is a negatively valenced counterpart that attaches to wrong actions, which we will call moral counterworth. In this paper, we explore the moral counterworth of wrong actions in order to shed new light on the nature of moral worth. Contrary to theorists in both camps, we argue that more than one kind of motivation can affect the moral worth of actions.
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publishDate 2023-03-01
publisher Michigan Publishing
record_format Article
series Ergo, An Open Access Journal of Philosophy
spelling doaj-art-2ebdc40ff33a4ec09afcd3e96ba8223d2025-08-20T02:48:41ZengMichigan PublishingErgo, An Open Access Journal of Philosophy2330-40142023-03-019010.3998/ergo.2621Cruel Intentions and Evil DeedsEyal Tal0Hannah Tierney1Brandeis UniversityUniversity of California, DavisWhat it means for an action to have moral worth, and what is required for this to be the case, is the subject of continued controversy. Some argue that an agent performs a morally worthy action if and only if they do it because the action is morally right. Others argue that a morally worthy action is that which an agent performs because of features that make the action right. These theorists, though they oppose one another, share something important in common. They focus almost exclusively on the moral worth of right actions. But there is a negatively valenced counterpart that attaches to wrong actions, which we will call moral counterworth. In this paper, we explore the moral counterworth of wrong actions in order to shed new light on the nature of moral worth. Contrary to theorists in both camps, we argue that more than one kind of motivation can affect the moral worth of actions.https://journals.publishing.umich.edu/ergo/article/id/2621/
spellingShingle Eyal Tal
Hannah Tierney
Cruel Intentions and Evil Deeds
Ergo, An Open Access Journal of Philosophy
title Cruel Intentions and Evil Deeds
title_full Cruel Intentions and Evil Deeds
title_fullStr Cruel Intentions and Evil Deeds
title_full_unstemmed Cruel Intentions and Evil Deeds
title_short Cruel Intentions and Evil Deeds
title_sort cruel intentions and evil deeds
url https://journals.publishing.umich.edu/ergo/article/id/2621/
work_keys_str_mv AT eyaltal cruelintentionsandevildeeds
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