Virtual Agents-Based Attack-Resilient Distributed Control for Islanded AC Microgrid
Due to its dependence on a communication network, distributed secondary control of microgrids is susceptible to denial-of-service (DoS) attacks in channel shutdown mode, which may negatively impact the network connectivity and thus deteriorate the coordination and power sharing among distributed gen...
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2025-01-01
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Online Access: | https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10847855/ |
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author | Jun Zhang Sheik M. Mohiuddin Junjian Qi |
author_facet | Jun Zhang Sheik M. Mohiuddin Junjian Qi |
author_sort | Jun Zhang |
collection | DOAJ |
description | Due to its dependence on a communication network, distributed secondary control of microgrids is susceptible to denial-of-service (DoS) attacks in channel shutdown mode, which may negatively impact the network connectivity and thus deteriorate the coordination and power sharing among distributed generators (DGs). Honeypot is a common method for cyber deception by introducing fake targets. However, in the context of microgrid, the misleading information spread by honeypots will also impact the system performance. This paper proposes an attack-resilient distributed control for AC microgrids utilizing virtual agents (VAs) to counteract both DoS edge and node attacks. The VAs are designed to not impact the system’s steady state during normal operation but to share information among neighboring real agents and serve as dummy targets for DoS attacks. The control with VAs is implemented by a primal-dual gradient-based distributed algorithm to efficiently obtain a practical solution for voltage/frequency regulation and power sharing. The simulation results on a 4-DG test system and a modified IEEE 34-bus system show that 1) VAs do not impact the normal functionality of the test system, and 2) deploying VAs can enhance the resilience of the microgrid control against DoS edge and node attacks. |
format | Article |
id | doaj-art-2aa352e12f5e4aa6a71aba1f28864a14 |
institution | Kabale University |
issn | 2169-3536 |
language | English |
publishDate | 2025-01-01 |
publisher | IEEE |
record_format | Article |
series | IEEE Access |
spelling | doaj-art-2aa352e12f5e4aa6a71aba1f28864a142025-01-29T00:01:11ZengIEEEIEEE Access2169-35362025-01-0113158251583910.1109/ACCESS.2025.353217210847855Virtual Agents-Based Attack-Resilient Distributed Control for Islanded AC MicrogridJun Zhang0https://orcid.org/0009-0006-0646-3761Sheik M. Mohiuddin1https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0815-3928Junjian Qi2https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4043-9427McComish Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, South Dakota State University, Brookings, SD, USAEnergy and Environment Directorate, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Richland, WA, USAMcComish Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, South Dakota State University, Brookings, SD, USADue to its dependence on a communication network, distributed secondary control of microgrids is susceptible to denial-of-service (DoS) attacks in channel shutdown mode, which may negatively impact the network connectivity and thus deteriorate the coordination and power sharing among distributed generators (DGs). Honeypot is a common method for cyber deception by introducing fake targets. However, in the context of microgrid, the misleading information spread by honeypots will also impact the system performance. This paper proposes an attack-resilient distributed control for AC microgrids utilizing virtual agents (VAs) to counteract both DoS edge and node attacks. The VAs are designed to not impact the system’s steady state during normal operation but to share information among neighboring real agents and serve as dummy targets for DoS attacks. The control with VAs is implemented by a primal-dual gradient-based distributed algorithm to efficiently obtain a practical solution for voltage/frequency regulation and power sharing. The simulation results on a 4-DG test system and a modified IEEE 34-bus system show that 1) VAs do not impact the normal functionality of the test system, and 2) deploying VAs can enhance the resilience of the microgrid control against DoS edge and node attacks.https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10847855/AC microgridcooperative controldenial-of-service (DoS) attackdistributed algorithmdistributed controlprimal-dual gradient |
spellingShingle | Jun Zhang Sheik M. Mohiuddin Junjian Qi Virtual Agents-Based Attack-Resilient Distributed Control for Islanded AC Microgrid IEEE Access AC microgrid cooperative control denial-of-service (DoS) attack distributed algorithm distributed control primal-dual gradient |
title | Virtual Agents-Based Attack-Resilient Distributed Control for Islanded AC Microgrid |
title_full | Virtual Agents-Based Attack-Resilient Distributed Control for Islanded AC Microgrid |
title_fullStr | Virtual Agents-Based Attack-Resilient Distributed Control for Islanded AC Microgrid |
title_full_unstemmed | Virtual Agents-Based Attack-Resilient Distributed Control for Islanded AC Microgrid |
title_short | Virtual Agents-Based Attack-Resilient Distributed Control for Islanded AC Microgrid |
title_sort | virtual agents based attack resilient distributed control for islanded ac microgrid |
topic | AC microgrid cooperative control denial-of-service (DoS) attack distributed algorithm distributed control primal-dual gradient |
url | https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10847855/ |
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