Divine Simplicity and the Theory of Action
The modal collapse argument states that the traditional doctrine of divine simplicity entails that God necessarily creates whatever he creates and also that all creatures necessarily perform whatever actions they perform. In response to these objections, many authors argue that God’s willing to cre...
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Catholic University of Louvain
2024-12-01
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| Series: | TheoLogica |
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| Online Access: | https://ojs.uclouvain.be/index.php/theologica/article/view/82053 |
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| author | Clemente Huneeus |
| author_facet | Clemente Huneeus |
| author_sort | Clemente Huneeus |
| collection | DOAJ |
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The modal collapse argument states that the traditional doctrine of divine simplicity entails that God necessarily creates whatever he creates and also that all creatures necessarily perform whatever actions they perform. In response to these objections, many authors argue that God’s willing to create this precise world and God’s knowing everything about individual creatures are at least partially extrinsic or Cambridge properties (i.e., the truthmaker of the respective propositions is, in part, a fact about something contingent other than God). This paper argues for a general view of action, in which such properties can turn out to be at least partially extrinsic. Section 1 explains why responding to the modal collapse argument requires that part of the truthmaker relating God to contingent facts be extrinsic to God, and that it is only in this part that contingency lies. Section 2 argues that this can be generally so in certain class of causal relations, where the agent remains intrinsically the same no matter the precise effect produced. Section 3 shows that free volition is at some level one of those relations, and section 4 offers some brief remarks about the difficulties that still remain in the case of knowledge.
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| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-29a24178625f47dbbfaf20e640aa8b23 |
| institution | DOAJ |
| issn | 2593-0265 |
| language | deu |
| publishDate | 2024-12-01 |
| publisher | Catholic University of Louvain |
| record_format | Article |
| series | TheoLogica |
| spelling | doaj-art-29a24178625f47dbbfaf20e640aa8b232025-08-20T02:49:17ZdeuCatholic University of LouvainTheoLogica2593-02652024-12-019110.14428/thl.v9i1.82053Divine Simplicity and the Theory of ActionClemente Huneeus 0Universidad de los Andes (Chile) & Universidad Gabriela Mistral The modal collapse argument states that the traditional doctrine of divine simplicity entails that God necessarily creates whatever he creates and also that all creatures necessarily perform whatever actions they perform. In response to these objections, many authors argue that God’s willing to create this precise world and God’s knowing everything about individual creatures are at least partially extrinsic or Cambridge properties (i.e., the truthmaker of the respective propositions is, in part, a fact about something contingent other than God). This paper argues for a general view of action, in which such properties can turn out to be at least partially extrinsic. Section 1 explains why responding to the modal collapse argument requires that part of the truthmaker relating God to contingent facts be extrinsic to God, and that it is only in this part that contingency lies. Section 2 argues that this can be generally so in certain class of causal relations, where the agent remains intrinsically the same no matter the precise effect produced. Section 3 shows that free volition is at some level one of those relations, and section 4 offers some brief remarks about the difficulties that still remain in the case of knowledge. https://ojs.uclouvain.be/index.php/theologica/article/view/82053Divine simplicitymodal collapse argumentdivine volitiondivine knowledgetheory of action |
| spellingShingle | Clemente Huneeus Divine Simplicity and the Theory of Action TheoLogica Divine simplicity modal collapse argument divine volition divine knowledge theory of action |
| title | Divine Simplicity and the Theory of Action |
| title_full | Divine Simplicity and the Theory of Action |
| title_fullStr | Divine Simplicity and the Theory of Action |
| title_full_unstemmed | Divine Simplicity and the Theory of Action |
| title_short | Divine Simplicity and the Theory of Action |
| title_sort | divine simplicity and the theory of action |
| topic | Divine simplicity modal collapse argument divine volition divine knowledge theory of action |
| url | https://ojs.uclouvain.be/index.php/theologica/article/view/82053 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT clementehuneeus divinesimplicityandthetheoryofaction |