Against Magnitude Realism
In recent work, Christopher Peacocke has argued for a kind of realism (or anti-reductionism) about magnitudes such as temperature and spatial distance. Peacocke’s argument is that magnitudes are an ineliminable commitment of scientific and everyday explanations (including high-level explanations),...
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Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM)
2023-05-01
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| Series: | Crítica |
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| Online Access: | https://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica/article/view/1407 |
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| author | Geoffrey Lee |
| author_facet | Geoffrey Lee |
| author_sort | Geoffrey Lee |
| collection | DOAJ |
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In recent work, Christopher Peacocke has argued for a kind of realism (or anti-reductionism) about magnitudes such as temperature and spatial distance. Peacocke’s argument is that magnitudes are an ineliminable commitment of scientific and everyday explanations (including high-level explanations), and that they are the natural candidates for semantic values of our ordinary magnitude talk, and for contents of our mental states. I critique these arguments, in particular focusing on whether the realist has a satisfactory account of how high-level magnitude facts are grounded in lower-level facts. I argue that a less realist (i.e., more reductionist approach) is preferable, or at least viable. I also aim to substantially clarify what is at stake in the debate.
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| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-2969a75aff164e32814ad20728c7cd2f |
| institution | Kabale University |
| issn | 0011-1503 1870-4905 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2023-05-01 |
| publisher | Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM) |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Crítica |
| spelling | doaj-art-2969a75aff164e32814ad20728c7cd2f2025-08-20T03:42:45ZengUniversidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM)Crítica0011-15031870-49052023-05-015516310.22201/iifs.18704905e.2023.1407Against Magnitude RealismGeoffrey Lee0University of California, Berkeley, Department of Philosophy In recent work, Christopher Peacocke has argued for a kind of realism (or anti-reductionism) about magnitudes such as temperature and spatial distance. Peacocke’s argument is that magnitudes are an ineliminable commitment of scientific and everyday explanations (including high-level explanations), and that they are the natural candidates for semantic values of our ordinary magnitude talk, and for contents of our mental states. I critique these arguments, in particular focusing on whether the realist has a satisfactory account of how high-level magnitude facts are grounded in lower-level facts. I argue that a less realist (i.e., more reductionist approach) is preferable, or at least viable. I also aim to substantially clarify what is at stake in the debate. https://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica/article/view/1407magnitudesgroundingreductionismrealismrelationism |
| spellingShingle | Geoffrey Lee Against Magnitude Realism Crítica magnitudes grounding reductionism realism relationism |
| title | Against Magnitude Realism |
| title_full | Against Magnitude Realism |
| title_fullStr | Against Magnitude Realism |
| title_full_unstemmed | Against Magnitude Realism |
| title_short | Against Magnitude Realism |
| title_sort | against magnitude realism |
| topic | magnitudes grounding reductionism realism relationism |
| url | https://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica/article/view/1407 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT geoffreylee againstmagnituderealism |