Can common institutional ownership constrain the equity pledges of controlling shareholders? Evidence from Chinese listed companies

The potential risks associated with controlling shareholders' equity pledges pose significant challenges to capital market stability and development. Therefore, effective mechanisms to constrain equity pledges have become a key focus of scholarly investigation. This study examines the impact of...

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Main Authors: Fangfang Zhou, Lianghua Chen, Libin Zhao, Xiangfei Fu
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Elsevier 2025-03-01
Series:Borsa Istanbul Review
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Online Access:http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214845025000158
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author Fangfang Zhou
Lianghua Chen
Libin Zhao
Xiangfei Fu
author_facet Fangfang Zhou
Lianghua Chen
Libin Zhao
Xiangfei Fu
author_sort Fangfang Zhou
collection DOAJ
description The potential risks associated with controlling shareholders' equity pledges pose significant challenges to capital market stability and development. Therefore, effective mechanisms to constrain equity pledges have become a key focus of scholarly investigation. This study examines the impact of common institutional ownership on controlling shareholders’ equity-pledging behavior using data from Chinese A-share listed firms between 2010 and 2021. The findings reveal that common institutional ownership significantly reduces equity-pledging activities among controlling shareholders. This relationship is robust across various tests, including the Heckman two-step model and instrumental variable approach. Mechanism analysis suggests that common institutional ownership influences equity pledging mainly through scale effects, board appointments, and exit threats. Moreover, the effect is stronger when long-term independent institutional investors are involved. These findings contribute to the literature by highlighting factors influencing equity pledges and showing how common institutional ownership reduces the risks associated with controlling shareholders' equity pledges.
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publishDate 2025-03-01
publisher Elsevier
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series Borsa Istanbul Review
spelling doaj-art-27f0ec5a299a43cdafa4f86fd124c3912025-08-20T02:45:56ZengElsevierBorsa Istanbul Review2214-84502025-03-0125231132210.1016/j.bir.2025.01.008Can common institutional ownership constrain the equity pledges of controlling shareholders? Evidence from Chinese listed companiesFangfang Zhou0Lianghua Chen1Libin Zhao2Xiangfei Fu3School of Economics and Management, Southeast University, ChinaSchool of Economics and Management, Southeast University, China; Corresponding author. No.2, Southeast University Road, Jiangning District, Nanjing, Jiangsu Province, China.School of Accounting, Wuhan Textile University, ChinaSchool of Accounting, Nanjing Audit University, ChinaThe potential risks associated with controlling shareholders' equity pledges pose significant challenges to capital market stability and development. Therefore, effective mechanisms to constrain equity pledges have become a key focus of scholarly investigation. This study examines the impact of common institutional ownership on controlling shareholders’ equity-pledging behavior using data from Chinese A-share listed firms between 2010 and 2021. The findings reveal that common institutional ownership significantly reduces equity-pledging activities among controlling shareholders. This relationship is robust across various tests, including the Heckman two-step model and instrumental variable approach. Mechanism analysis suggests that common institutional ownership influences equity pledging mainly through scale effects, board appointments, and exit threats. Moreover, the effect is stronger when long-term independent institutional investors are involved. These findings contribute to the literature by highlighting factors influencing equity pledges and showing how common institutional ownership reduces the risks associated with controlling shareholders' equity pledges.http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214845025000158G32G34
spellingShingle Fangfang Zhou
Lianghua Chen
Libin Zhao
Xiangfei Fu
Can common institutional ownership constrain the equity pledges of controlling shareholders? Evidence from Chinese listed companies
Borsa Istanbul Review
G32
G34
title Can common institutional ownership constrain the equity pledges of controlling shareholders? Evidence from Chinese listed companies
title_full Can common institutional ownership constrain the equity pledges of controlling shareholders? Evidence from Chinese listed companies
title_fullStr Can common institutional ownership constrain the equity pledges of controlling shareholders? Evidence from Chinese listed companies
title_full_unstemmed Can common institutional ownership constrain the equity pledges of controlling shareholders? Evidence from Chinese listed companies
title_short Can common institutional ownership constrain the equity pledges of controlling shareholders? Evidence from Chinese listed companies
title_sort can common institutional ownership constrain the equity pledges of controlling shareholders evidence from chinese listed companies
topic G32
G34
url http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214845025000158
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AT libinzhao cancommoninstitutionalownershipconstraintheequitypledgesofcontrollingshareholdersevidencefromchineselistedcompanies
AT xiangfeifu cancommoninstitutionalownershipconstraintheequitypledgesofcontrollingshareholdersevidencefromchineselistedcompanies