On the Virtue-theoretic Approach to Argument Appraisal
Abstract: Two criticisms of the virtue-theoretic approach to argument appraisal are as follows. First, it is inadequate as argument cogency is conceptually independent of the characteristics of arguers (Bowell and Kingsbury 2013). Second, it is unmotivated since the viability of virtue argumentatio...
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University of Windsor
2025-01-01
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| Series: | Informal Logic |
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| Online Access: | https://informallogic.ca/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/8380 |
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Abstract: Two criticisms of the virtue-theoretic approach to argument appraisal are as follows. First, it is inadequate as argument cogency is conceptually independent of the characteristics of arguers (Bowell and Kingsbury 2013). Second, it is unmotivated since the viability of virtue argumentation theory (VAT) doesn’t require a virtue-theoretic approach to argument appraisal. This deflates the first criticism as an evaluation of VAT (Gascon 2016, Paglieri 2015). I consider each and explain why it is misguided highlighting the connection between the general concept of good argument and associated criteria of goodness, and the connection between good arguments and good arguing.
Résumé: L’approche fondée sur la théorie de la vertu pour l’évaluation des arguments fait l’objet de deux critiques. Premièrement, elle est inadéquate, car la force de l’argument est conceptuellement indépendante des caractéristiques des argumentateurs (Bowell et Kingsbury 2013). Deuxièmement, elle est dénuée de motivation, car la viabilité de la théorie de l’argumentation fondée sur la vertu (AFV) ne nécessite pas une approche fondée sur la théorie de la vertu pour l’évaluation des arguments. Cela dévalorise la première critique en tant qu’évaluation de la AFV (Gascon 2016, Paglieri 2015). J’examine chacune de ces critiques et j’explique pourquoi elles sont erronées en soulignant le lien entre le concept général de bon argument et les critères de bonté qui lui sont associés, et le lien entre les bons arguments et la bonne argumentation.
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| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-27defcd9162c4f6bba58a06bc0cb6851 |
| institution | Kabale University |
| issn | 0824-2577 2293-734X |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2025-01-01 |
| publisher | University of Windsor |
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| series | Informal Logic |
| spelling | doaj-art-27defcd9162c4f6bba58a06bc0cb68512025-01-08T18:00:05ZengUniversity of WindsorInformal Logic0824-25772293-734X2025-01-0144410.22329/il.v44i4.8380On the Virtue-theoretic Approach to Argument AppraisalMatthew William McKeon0https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1416-241XMichigan State University Abstract: Two criticisms of the virtue-theoretic approach to argument appraisal are as follows. First, it is inadequate as argument cogency is conceptually independent of the characteristics of arguers (Bowell and Kingsbury 2013). Second, it is unmotivated since the viability of virtue argumentation theory (VAT) doesn’t require a virtue-theoretic approach to argument appraisal. This deflates the first criticism as an evaluation of VAT (Gascon 2016, Paglieri 2015). I consider each and explain why it is misguided highlighting the connection between the general concept of good argument and associated criteria of goodness, and the connection between good arguments and good arguing. Résumé: L’approche fondée sur la théorie de la vertu pour l’évaluation des arguments fait l’objet de deux critiques. Premièrement, elle est inadéquate, car la force de l’argument est conceptuellement indépendante des caractéristiques des argumentateurs (Bowell et Kingsbury 2013). Deuxièmement, elle est dénuée de motivation, car la viabilité de la théorie de l’argumentation fondée sur la vertu (AFV) ne nécessite pas une approche fondée sur la théorie de la vertu pour l’évaluation des arguments. Cela dévalorise la première critique en tant qu’évaluation de la AFV (Gascon 2016, Paglieri 2015). J’examine chacune de ces critiques et j’explique pourquoi elles sont erronées en soulignant le lien entre le concept général de bon argument et les critères de bonté qui lui sont associés, et le lien entre les bons arguments et la bonne argumentation. https://informallogic.ca/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/8380arguingargument appraisalreason-giving uses of argumentthick and thin concepts in argumentation theoryvirtue argumentation theory |
| spellingShingle | Matthew William McKeon On the Virtue-theoretic Approach to Argument Appraisal Informal Logic arguing argument appraisal reason-giving uses of argument thick and thin concepts in argumentation theory virtue argumentation theory |
| title | On the Virtue-theoretic Approach to Argument Appraisal |
| title_full | On the Virtue-theoretic Approach to Argument Appraisal |
| title_fullStr | On the Virtue-theoretic Approach to Argument Appraisal |
| title_full_unstemmed | On the Virtue-theoretic Approach to Argument Appraisal |
| title_short | On the Virtue-theoretic Approach to Argument Appraisal |
| title_sort | on the virtue theoretic approach to argument appraisal |
| topic | arguing argument appraisal reason-giving uses of argument thick and thin concepts in argumentation theory virtue argumentation theory |
| url | https://informallogic.ca/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/8380 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT matthewwilliammckeon onthevirtuetheoreticapproachtoargumentappraisal |