Development of optimal participating strategy for source‐grid‐load‐storage integrated projects in electricity markets with multi‐stage joint optimization
Abstract To promote peer‐to‐peer trading in a distribution system with the franchise owned by the concerned distribution company respected, a so‐called “source‐grid‐load‐storage” (SGLS) integrated project is promoted in China. Given this background, this paper proposes a multi‐stage joint optimizati...
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
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Wiley
2024-12-01
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Series: | IET Renewable Power Generation |
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Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.1049/rpg2.13139 |
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author | Zihao Li Yu Yang Yifan Shi Li Yao Wei Liu Fushuan Wen |
author_facet | Zihao Li Yu Yang Yifan Shi Li Yao Wei Liu Fushuan Wen |
author_sort | Zihao Li |
collection | DOAJ |
description | Abstract To promote peer‐to‐peer trading in a distribution system with the franchise owned by the concerned distribution company respected, a so‐called “source‐grid‐load‐storage” (SGLS) integrated project is promoted in China. Given this background, this paper proposes a multi‐stage joint optimization model to optimize the participating strategy for SGLS‐IPs in electricity energy and ancillary service markets. A multi‐energy flow park model is presented with electricity, gas, and heat included. A two‐stage model for optimal participating strategy of SGLS‐IPs in electricity and ancillary service markets is then presented. Through scenario analysis of a sample system, the attained revenue of an SGLS‐IP in different markets is evaluated. Additionally, a bilevel Stackelberg game model is introduced for internal electric vehicle clusters (EVCs) within an SGLS‐IP, with the upper level representing an SGLS‐IP, and the lower level representing EV users engaging in the game. The effectiveness of the model is validated through case studies. Simulation results demonstrate that reasonable market participation and pricing strategies contribute to the efficient allocation of resources within a SGLS‐IP and a win‐win outcome for both the SGLS‐IP entity and EV users. |
format | Article |
id | doaj-art-252aa002e99c4738b4c325925064849f |
institution | Kabale University |
issn | 1752-1416 1752-1424 |
language | English |
publishDate | 2024-12-01 |
publisher | Wiley |
record_format | Article |
series | IET Renewable Power Generation |
spelling | doaj-art-252aa002e99c4738b4c325925064849f2025-01-30T12:15:54ZengWileyIET Renewable Power Generation1752-14161752-14242024-12-0118164056406810.1049/rpg2.13139Development of optimal participating strategy for source‐grid‐load‐storage integrated projects in electricity markets with multi‐stage joint optimizationZihao Li0Yu Yang1Yifan Shi2Li Yao3Wei Liu4Fushuan Wen5College of Electrical Engineering Zhejiang University Hangzhou ChinaCollege of Electrical Engineering Zhejiang University Hangzhou ChinaCollege of Electrical Engineering Zhejiang University Hangzhou ChinaMarketing Service Center State Grid Zhejiang Electric Power Co. Ltd Hangzhou ChinaMarketing Service Center State Grid Zhejiang Electric Power Co. Ltd Hangzhou ChinaCollege of Electrical Engineering Zhejiang University Hangzhou ChinaAbstract To promote peer‐to‐peer trading in a distribution system with the franchise owned by the concerned distribution company respected, a so‐called “source‐grid‐load‐storage” (SGLS) integrated project is promoted in China. Given this background, this paper proposes a multi‐stage joint optimization model to optimize the participating strategy for SGLS‐IPs in electricity energy and ancillary service markets. A multi‐energy flow park model is presented with electricity, gas, and heat included. A two‐stage model for optimal participating strategy of SGLS‐IPs in electricity and ancillary service markets is then presented. Through scenario analysis of a sample system, the attained revenue of an SGLS‐IP in different markets is evaluated. Additionally, a bilevel Stackelberg game model is introduced for internal electric vehicle clusters (EVCs) within an SGLS‐IP, with the upper level representing an SGLS‐IP, and the lower level representing EV users engaging in the game. The effectiveness of the model is validated through case studies. Simulation results demonstrate that reasonable market participation and pricing strategies contribute to the efficient allocation of resources within a SGLS‐IP and a win‐win outcome for both the SGLS‐IP entity and EV users.https://doi.org/10.1049/rpg2.13139power marketsvehicle‐to‐grid |
spellingShingle | Zihao Li Yu Yang Yifan Shi Li Yao Wei Liu Fushuan Wen Development of optimal participating strategy for source‐grid‐load‐storage integrated projects in electricity markets with multi‐stage joint optimization IET Renewable Power Generation power markets vehicle‐to‐grid |
title | Development of optimal participating strategy for source‐grid‐load‐storage integrated projects in electricity markets with multi‐stage joint optimization |
title_full | Development of optimal participating strategy for source‐grid‐load‐storage integrated projects in electricity markets with multi‐stage joint optimization |
title_fullStr | Development of optimal participating strategy for source‐grid‐load‐storage integrated projects in electricity markets with multi‐stage joint optimization |
title_full_unstemmed | Development of optimal participating strategy for source‐grid‐load‐storage integrated projects in electricity markets with multi‐stage joint optimization |
title_short | Development of optimal participating strategy for source‐grid‐load‐storage integrated projects in electricity markets with multi‐stage joint optimization |
title_sort | development of optimal participating strategy for source grid load storage integrated projects in electricity markets with multi stage joint optimization |
topic | power markets vehicle‐to‐grid |
url | https://doi.org/10.1049/rpg2.13139 |
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