Location-Price Competition in Airline Networks

This paper addresses location-then-price competition in airline market as a two-stage game of n players on the graph. Passenger’s demand distribution is described by multinomial logit model. Equilibrium in price game is computed through best response dynamics. We solve location game using backward i...

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Main Authors: H. Gao, J. Hu, V. Mazalov, A. Shchiptsova, L. Song, J. Tokareva
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Wiley 2014-01-01
Series:Journal of Applied Mathematics
Online Access:http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2014/494103
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author H. Gao
J. Hu
V. Mazalov
A. Shchiptsova
L. Song
J. Tokareva
author_facet H. Gao
J. Hu
V. Mazalov
A. Shchiptsova
L. Song
J. Tokareva
author_sort H. Gao
collection DOAJ
description This paper addresses location-then-price competition in airline market as a two-stage game of n players on the graph. Passenger’s demand distribution is described by multinomial logit model. Equilibrium in price game is computed through best response dynamics. We solve location game using backward induction, knowing that airlines will choose prices from equilibrium for the second-stage game. Some numerical results for airline market under consideration are presented.
format Article
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institution Kabale University
issn 1110-757X
1687-0042
language English
publishDate 2014-01-01
publisher Wiley
record_format Article
series Journal of Applied Mathematics
spelling doaj-art-250397b3fcd7408a9d10cf363adff3a62025-02-03T01:10:30ZengWileyJournal of Applied Mathematics1110-757X1687-00422014-01-01201410.1155/2014/494103494103Location-Price Competition in Airline NetworksH. Gao0J. Hu1V. Mazalov2A. Shchiptsova3L. Song4J. Tokareva5College of Mathematics, Qingdao University, 308 Ningxia Road, Qingdao 266071, ChinaBusiness School, Qingdao University, 308 Ningxia Road, Qingdao 266071, ChinaInstitute of Applied Mathematical Research, Karelian Research Centre of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Pushkinskaya Street 11, Petrozavodsk 185910, RussiaInstitute of Applied Mathematical Research, Karelian Research Centre of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Pushkinskaya Street 11, Petrozavodsk 185910, RussiaCollege of Mathematics, Qingdao University, 308 Ningxia Road, Qingdao 266071, ChinaTransbaikal State University, Alexandro-Zavodskaya Street 30, Chita 672039, RussiaThis paper addresses location-then-price competition in airline market as a two-stage game of n players on the graph. Passenger’s demand distribution is described by multinomial logit model. Equilibrium in price game is computed through best response dynamics. We solve location game using backward induction, knowing that airlines will choose prices from equilibrium for the second-stage game. Some numerical results for airline market under consideration are presented.http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2014/494103
spellingShingle H. Gao
J. Hu
V. Mazalov
A. Shchiptsova
L. Song
J. Tokareva
Location-Price Competition in Airline Networks
Journal of Applied Mathematics
title Location-Price Competition in Airline Networks
title_full Location-Price Competition in Airline Networks
title_fullStr Location-Price Competition in Airline Networks
title_full_unstemmed Location-Price Competition in Airline Networks
title_short Location-Price Competition in Airline Networks
title_sort location price competition in airline networks
url http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2014/494103
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AT vmazalov locationpricecompetitioninairlinenetworks
AT ashchiptsova locationpricecompetitioninairlinenetworks
AT lsong locationpricecompetitioninairlinenetworks
AT jtokareva locationpricecompetitioninairlinenetworks