TACIT COLLUSION UNDER COMPETITION LAW: PRICING ALGORITHMS
A great level of transparency, resulting from data sharing (exchange of information), combined with use of algorithms may lead to reciprocal price or production control by competitors. Algorithms eliminate elements of spontaneity in market and may result in supracompetitive prices. But the collusive...
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| Main Author: | Stella Solernou SANZ |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Nicolae Titulescu University Publishing House
2021-05-01
|
| Series: | Challenges of the Knowledge Society |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://cks.univnt.ro/download/cks_2021_articles%252F2_private_law%252FCKS_2021_PRIVATE_LAW_019.pdf |
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