To Have a Need

Philosophers often identify needing something with requiring it to avoid harm. This view of need is roughly accurate, but no adequate analysis of the relevant sort of requirement has been given, and the relevant notion of harm has not been clarified. Further, the harm-avoidance picture must be broad...

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Main Author: Russ Colton
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Michigan Publishing 2023-11-01
Series:Ergo, An Open Access Journal of Philosophy
Online Access:https://journals.publishing.umich.edu/ergo/article/id/4643/
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author Russ Colton
author_facet Russ Colton
author_sort Russ Colton
collection DOAJ
description Philosophers often identify needing something with requiring it to avoid harm. This view of need is roughly accurate, but no adequate analysis of the relevant sort of requirement has been given, and the relevant notion of harm has not been clarified. Further, the harm-avoidance picture must be broadened, because we also need what is required to reduce danger. I offer two analyses of need (one probabilistic) to address these shortcomings. The analyses are at a high level of generality and accommodate our ordinary notion of need as well as narrower conceptions. I also explain why the only extant, detailed modal account of need, David Wiggins’s (1987/1998), is inadequate. My analyses imply that to have a need for something is to have the (expected) quality of one’s life depend counterfactually on it in a certain way. The analyses shed some light on need’s distinctive normative significance.
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series Ergo, An Open Access Journal of Philosophy
spelling doaj-art-2445fbd6d7c44816902b4cf67a1065ef2025-08-20T02:13:24ZengMichigan PublishingErgo, An Open Access Journal of Philosophy2330-40142023-11-0110010.3998/ergo.4643To Have a NeedRuss Colton0Independent ScholarPhilosophers often identify needing something with requiring it to avoid harm. This view of need is roughly accurate, but no adequate analysis of the relevant sort of requirement has been given, and the relevant notion of harm has not been clarified. Further, the harm-avoidance picture must be broadened, because we also need what is required to reduce danger. I offer two analyses of need (one probabilistic) to address these shortcomings. The analyses are at a high level of generality and accommodate our ordinary notion of need as well as narrower conceptions. I also explain why the only extant, detailed modal account of need, David Wiggins’s (1987/1998), is inadequate. My analyses imply that to have a need for something is to have the (expected) quality of one’s life depend counterfactually on it in a certain way. The analyses shed some light on need’s distinctive normative significance.https://journals.publishing.umich.edu/ergo/article/id/4643/
spellingShingle Russ Colton
To Have a Need
Ergo, An Open Access Journal of Philosophy
title To Have a Need
title_full To Have a Need
title_fullStr To Have a Need
title_full_unstemmed To Have a Need
title_short To Have a Need
title_sort to have a need
url https://journals.publishing.umich.edu/ergo/article/id/4643/
work_keys_str_mv AT russcolton tohaveaneed