Issues in Grounded Cognition and How to Solve Them – the Minimalist Account
The field of grounded cognition is concerned with how concepts are represented by re-activation of the bodily modalities. Considerable empirical work supports this core tenet, but the field is rife with meta-theoretical issues which prevent meaningfully progressing beyond this. We describe these iss...
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| Language: | English |
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Ubiquity Press
2025-04-01
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| Series: | Journal of Cognition |
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| Online Access: | https://account.journalofcognition.org/index.php/up-j-jc/article/view/444 |
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| author | Jannis Friedrich Martin H. Fischer Markus Raab |
| author_facet | Jannis Friedrich Martin H. Fischer Markus Raab |
| author_sort | Jannis Friedrich |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | The field of grounded cognition is concerned with how concepts are represented by re-activation of the bodily modalities. Considerable empirical work supports this core tenet, but the field is rife with meta-theoretical issues which prevent meaningfully progressing beyond this. We describe these issues and provide a solution: an overarching theoretical framework. The two most commonly cited grounded cognition theories are perceptual symbol systems and conceptual metaphor theory. Under perceptual symbol systems, concepts are represented by integrating fragments of multi-modal percepts in a simulator. Conceptual metaphor theory involves a limited number of image schemas, primitive structural regularities extracted from interaction with the environment, undergoing a limited number of transformations into a concept. Both theories constitute important developments to understanding mental representations, yet we argue that they currently impede progress because they are prematurely elaborate. This forces them to rely on overly specific assumptions, which generates a lack of conceptual clarity and unsystematic testing of empirical work. Our minimalist account takes grounded cognition ‘back to basics’ with a common-denominator framework supported by converging evidence from other fields. It postulates that concepts are represented by simulation, re-activating mental states that were active when experiencing this concept, and by metaphoric mapping, when concrete representations are sourced to represent abstract concepts. This enables incremental theory development without uncertain assumptions because it allows for descriptive research while nonetheless enabling falsification of theories. Our proposal provides the tools to resolve meta-theoretical issues and encourages a research program that integrates grounded cognition into the cognitive sciences. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-215bb8ae2c1f42e68d0bcc3575654e2f |
| institution | DOAJ |
| issn | 2514-4820 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2025-04-01 |
| publisher | Ubiquity Press |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Journal of Cognition |
| spelling | doaj-art-215bb8ae2c1f42e68d0bcc3575654e2f2025-08-20T03:07:44ZengUbiquity PressJournal of Cognition2514-48202025-04-0181313110.5334/joc.444443Issues in Grounded Cognition and How to Solve Them – the Minimalist AccountJannis Friedrich0https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7513-0000Martin H. Fischer1https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3818-7272Markus Raab2https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6546-1666Institute of Psychology, German Sport University Cologne, KolnPotsdam Embodied Cognition Group, Psychology Department, University of Potsdam, Potsdam OT GolmInstitute of Psychology, German Sport University Cologne, KolnThe field of grounded cognition is concerned with how concepts are represented by re-activation of the bodily modalities. Considerable empirical work supports this core tenet, but the field is rife with meta-theoretical issues which prevent meaningfully progressing beyond this. We describe these issues and provide a solution: an overarching theoretical framework. The two most commonly cited grounded cognition theories are perceptual symbol systems and conceptual metaphor theory. Under perceptual symbol systems, concepts are represented by integrating fragments of multi-modal percepts in a simulator. Conceptual metaphor theory involves a limited number of image schemas, primitive structural regularities extracted from interaction with the environment, undergoing a limited number of transformations into a concept. Both theories constitute important developments to understanding mental representations, yet we argue that they currently impede progress because they are prematurely elaborate. This forces them to rely on overly specific assumptions, which generates a lack of conceptual clarity and unsystematic testing of empirical work. Our minimalist account takes grounded cognition ‘back to basics’ with a common-denominator framework supported by converging evidence from other fields. It postulates that concepts are represented by simulation, re-activating mental states that were active when experiencing this concept, and by metaphoric mapping, when concrete representations are sourced to represent abstract concepts. This enables incremental theory development without uncertain assumptions because it allows for descriptive research while nonetheless enabling falsification of theories. Our proposal provides the tools to resolve meta-theoretical issues and encourages a research program that integrates grounded cognition into the cognitive sciences.https://account.journalofcognition.org/index.php/up-j-jc/article/view/444embodied cognitionsemanticsaction and perceptionemotion and cognition |
| spellingShingle | Jannis Friedrich Martin H. Fischer Markus Raab Issues in Grounded Cognition and How to Solve Them – the Minimalist Account Journal of Cognition embodied cognition semantics action and perception emotion and cognition |
| title | Issues in Grounded Cognition and How to Solve Them – the Minimalist Account |
| title_full | Issues in Grounded Cognition and How to Solve Them – the Minimalist Account |
| title_fullStr | Issues in Grounded Cognition and How to Solve Them – the Minimalist Account |
| title_full_unstemmed | Issues in Grounded Cognition and How to Solve Them – the Minimalist Account |
| title_short | Issues in Grounded Cognition and How to Solve Them – the Minimalist Account |
| title_sort | issues in grounded cognition and how to solve them the minimalist account |
| topic | embodied cognition semantics action and perception emotion and cognition |
| url | https://account.journalofcognition.org/index.php/up-j-jc/article/view/444 |
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