How to Authenticate a Device? Formal Authentication Models for M2M Communications Defending against Ghost Compromising Attack
In Machine-to-Machine (M2M) communications, authentication of a device is of upmost importance for applications of Internet of Things. As traditional authentication schemes always assume the presence of a person, most authentication technologies cannot be applied in machine-centric M2M context. In t...
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| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Wiley
2013-02-01
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| Series: | International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks |
| Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.1155/2013/679450 |
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| _version_ | 1849307996111241216 |
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| author | Wei Ren Linchen Yu Liangli Ma Yi Ren |
| author_facet | Wei Ren Linchen Yu Liangli Ma Yi Ren |
| author_sort | Wei Ren |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | In Machine-to-Machine (M2M) communications, authentication of a device is of upmost importance for applications of Internet of Things. As traditional authentication schemes always assume the presence of a person, most authentication technologies cannot be applied in machine-centric M2M context. In this paper, we make the first attempt to formally model the authentication in M2M. We first model four attacking adversaries that can formulate all possible attacks in M2M, which are channel eavesdropping attack, credential compromise attack, function compromise attack, and ghost compromise attack. Next, we propose four models to tackle those corresponding adversaries, namely, credential-based model, machine-metrics-based model, reference-based model, and witness-based model. We also illustrate several concrete attacking methods and authentication approaches. We proof the authentication security for all proposed models and compare them for clarity. Our models present soundness and completeness in terms of authentication security, which can guide the design and analysis of concrete authentication protocols. Particularly, we construct a uniform authentication framework for M2M context and point out all possible authentication mechanisms in M2M. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-1fba535f2c4b4d40a2efee7cd9ce10f2 |
| institution | Kabale University |
| issn | 1550-1477 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2013-02-01 |
| publisher | Wiley |
| record_format | Article |
| series | International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks |
| spelling | doaj-art-1fba535f2c4b4d40a2efee7cd9ce10f22025-08-20T03:54:34ZengWileyInternational Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks1550-14772013-02-01910.1155/2013/679450How to Authenticate a Device? Formal Authentication Models for M2M Communications Defending against Ghost Compromising AttackWei Ren0Linchen Yu1Liangli Ma2Yi Ren3 Shandong Provincial Key Laboratory of Computer Network, Jinan 250014, China School of Computer Science, China University of Geosciences, Wuhan 430074, China School of Electronic Engineering, Naval University of Engineering, Wuhan 430033, China Department of Computer Science, National Chiao Tung University, Hsinchu 30010, TaiwanIn Machine-to-Machine (M2M) communications, authentication of a device is of upmost importance for applications of Internet of Things. As traditional authentication schemes always assume the presence of a person, most authentication technologies cannot be applied in machine-centric M2M context. In this paper, we make the first attempt to formally model the authentication in M2M. We first model four attacking adversaries that can formulate all possible attacks in M2M, which are channel eavesdropping attack, credential compromise attack, function compromise attack, and ghost compromise attack. Next, we propose four models to tackle those corresponding adversaries, namely, credential-based model, machine-metrics-based model, reference-based model, and witness-based model. We also illustrate several concrete attacking methods and authentication approaches. We proof the authentication security for all proposed models and compare them for clarity. Our models present soundness and completeness in terms of authentication security, which can guide the design and analysis of concrete authentication protocols. Particularly, we construct a uniform authentication framework for M2M context and point out all possible authentication mechanisms in M2M.https://doi.org/10.1155/2013/679450 |
| spellingShingle | Wei Ren Linchen Yu Liangli Ma Yi Ren How to Authenticate a Device? Formal Authentication Models for M2M Communications Defending against Ghost Compromising Attack International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks |
| title | How to Authenticate a Device? Formal Authentication Models for M2M Communications Defending against Ghost Compromising Attack |
| title_full | How to Authenticate a Device? Formal Authentication Models for M2M Communications Defending against Ghost Compromising Attack |
| title_fullStr | How to Authenticate a Device? Formal Authentication Models for M2M Communications Defending against Ghost Compromising Attack |
| title_full_unstemmed | How to Authenticate a Device? Formal Authentication Models for M2M Communications Defending against Ghost Compromising Attack |
| title_short | How to Authenticate a Device? Formal Authentication Models for M2M Communications Defending against Ghost Compromising Attack |
| title_sort | how to authenticate a device formal authentication models for m2m communications defending against ghost compromising attack |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1155/2013/679450 |
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