Side-Channel Attack on ARADI in Non-Profiling Scenarios
ARADI is a low-latency block cipher introduced by the NSA (National Security Agency), designed with consideration for applications in memory encryption. In this study, we present the first results of side-channel attacks on ARADI, exposing its vulnerabilities to physical attacks in a non-profiling s...
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IEEE
2025-01-01
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| Series: | IEEE Access |
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| Online Access: | https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/11071292/ |
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| author | Donggeun Kwon Seokhie Hong |
| author_facet | Donggeun Kwon Seokhie Hong |
| author_sort | Donggeun Kwon |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | ARADI is a low-latency block cipher introduced by the NSA (National Security Agency), designed with consideration for applications in memory encryption. In this study, we present the first results of side-channel attacks on ARADI, exposing its vulnerabilities to physical attacks in a non-profiling scenario. We propose a novel bitwise divide-and-conquer methodology tailored for ARADI, and extend the approach to recover the full 256-bit master key. Using power consumption traces from an ARM processor, our experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of our attack method, achieving key recovery with only 2,000 traces. These findings highlight critical weaknesses in the physical security of ARADI and emphasize the need for robust countermeasures to address side-channel vulnerabilities without compromising performance. This research provides new insights into the practical security of ARADI, underscoring the importance of integrating physical attack resilience in cryptographic designs. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-1ea0803115a74e85aa63cc2e46086b5e |
| institution | DOAJ |
| issn | 2169-3536 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2025-01-01 |
| publisher | IEEE |
| record_format | Article |
| series | IEEE Access |
| spelling | doaj-art-1ea0803115a74e85aa63cc2e46086b5e2025-08-20T03:13:39ZengIEEEIEEE Access2169-35362025-01-011312262812263510.1109/ACCESS.2025.358555911071292Side-Channel Attack on ARADI in Non-Profiling ScenariosDonggeun Kwon0https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5269-7634Seokhie Hong1https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7506-4023School of Cybersecurity, Korea University, Seoul, Republic of KoreaSchool of Cybersecurity, Korea University, Seoul, Republic of KoreaARADI is a low-latency block cipher introduced by the NSA (National Security Agency), designed with consideration for applications in memory encryption. In this study, we present the first results of side-channel attacks on ARADI, exposing its vulnerabilities to physical attacks in a non-profiling scenario. We propose a novel bitwise divide-and-conquer methodology tailored for ARADI, and extend the approach to recover the full 256-bit master key. Using power consumption traces from an ARM processor, our experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of our attack method, achieving key recovery with only 2,000 traces. These findings highlight critical weaknesses in the physical security of ARADI and emphasize the need for robust countermeasures to address side-channel vulnerabilities without compromising performance. This research provides new insights into the practical security of ARADI, underscoring the importance of integrating physical attack resilience in cryptographic designs.https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/11071292/Block cipherside-channel attacknon-profilingpower analysisARM processor |
| spellingShingle | Donggeun Kwon Seokhie Hong Side-Channel Attack on ARADI in Non-Profiling Scenarios IEEE Access Block cipher side-channel attack non-profiling power analysis ARM processor |
| title | Side-Channel Attack on ARADI in Non-Profiling Scenarios |
| title_full | Side-Channel Attack on ARADI in Non-Profiling Scenarios |
| title_fullStr | Side-Channel Attack on ARADI in Non-Profiling Scenarios |
| title_full_unstemmed | Side-Channel Attack on ARADI in Non-Profiling Scenarios |
| title_short | Side-Channel Attack on ARADI in Non-Profiling Scenarios |
| title_sort | side channel attack on aradi in non profiling scenarios |
| topic | Block cipher side-channel attack non-profiling power analysis ARM processor |
| url | https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/11071292/ |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT donggeunkwon sidechannelattackonaradiinnonprofilingscenarios AT seokhiehong sidechannelattackonaradiinnonprofilingscenarios |