Being Is a Being
Heidegger claims that “the Being of beings ‘is’ not itself a being.” While he does not seem to argue for this claim (usually referred to as the “ontological difference”), there is now a very substantial literature that fills this gap. In this article, I subject this literature to philosophical scrut...
Saved in:
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
De Gruyter
2025-02-01
|
| Series: | Open Philosophy |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.1515/opphil-2024-0058 |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| Summary: | Heidegger claims that “the Being of beings ‘is’ not itself a being.” While he does not seem to argue for this claim (usually referred to as the “ontological difference”), there is now a very substantial literature that fills this gap. In this article, I subject this literature to philosophical scrutiny. My conclusion is that none of the extant arguments for the ontological difference is sound. Since, by contrast, we have at least two good reasons to think that Being is a being, this suggests that Being is a being, after all. |
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 2543-8875 |