Moran on Self-Knowledge, Agency and Responsibility
In this paper I deal with Richard Moran’s account of self-knowledge in his book Authority and Estrangement. After presenting the main lines of his account, I contend that, in spite of its novelty and interest, it may have some shortcomings. Concerning beliefs formed through deliberation, the accoun...
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| Language: | English |
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Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM)
2018-12-01
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| Series: | Crítica |
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| Online Access: | https://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica/article/view/486 |
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| author | Carlos J. Moya |
| author_facet | Carlos J. Moya |
| author_sort | Carlos J. Moya |
| collection | DOAJ |
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In this paper I deal with Richard Moran’s account of self-knowledge in his book Authority and Estrangement. After presenting the main lines of his account, I contend that, in spite of its novelty and interest, it may have some shortcomings. Concerning beliefs formed through deliberation, the account would seem to face problems of circularity or regress. And it looks also wanting concerning beliefs not formed in this way. I go on to suggest a diagnosis of these problems, according to which they would arise out of a view of agents too strongly dependent on the will.
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| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-18e8a588c3194ae5987bfefb1b436d8e |
| institution | DOAJ |
| issn | 0011-1503 1870-4905 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2018-12-01 |
| publisher | Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM) |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Crítica |
| spelling | doaj-art-18e8a588c3194ae5987bfefb1b436d8e2025-08-20T02:41:20ZengUniversidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM)Crítica0011-15031870-49052018-12-013811410.22201/iifs.18704905e.2006.486Moran on Self-Knowledge, Agency and ResponsibilityCarlos J. Moya0Departamento de Metafísica y Teoría del Conocimiento Universidad de Valencia In this paper I deal with Richard Moran’s account of self-knowledge in his book Authority and Estrangement. After presenting the main lines of his account, I contend that, in spite of its novelty and interest, it may have some shortcomings. Concerning beliefs formed through deliberation, the account would seem to face problems of circularity or regress. And it looks also wanting concerning beliefs not formed in this way. I go on to suggest a diagnosis of these problems, according to which they would arise out of a view of agents too strongly dependent on the will. https://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica/article/view/486first personbeliefdeliberationavowals |
| spellingShingle | Carlos J. Moya Moran on Self-Knowledge, Agency and Responsibility Crítica first person belief deliberation avowals |
| title | Moran on Self-Knowledge, Agency and Responsibility |
| title_full | Moran on Self-Knowledge, Agency and Responsibility |
| title_fullStr | Moran on Self-Knowledge, Agency and Responsibility |
| title_full_unstemmed | Moran on Self-Knowledge, Agency and Responsibility |
| title_short | Moran on Self-Knowledge, Agency and Responsibility |
| title_sort | moran on self knowledge agency and responsibility |
| topic | first person belief deliberation avowals |
| url | https://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/index.php/critica/article/view/486 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT carlosjmoya moranonselfknowledgeagencyandresponsibility |