Review of Egan F. Deflating Mental Representation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 192, 2025.
Abstract This review critically examines Frances Egan’s Deflating Mental Representation (MIT Press, 2025), a seminal work in the philosophy of mind that challenges traditional conceptions of mental representation and intentionality. Egan argues for a deflationary account wherein ascriptions of conte...
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| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas
2025-08-01
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| Series: | Manuscrito |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452025000400600&tlng=en |
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| Summary: | Abstract This review critically examines Frances Egan’s Deflating Mental Representation (MIT Press, 2025), a seminal work in the philosophy of mind that challenges traditional conceptions of mental representation and intentionality. Egan argues for a deflationary account wherein ascriptions of content to mental states are pragmatically grounded and serve primarily as explanatory tools, rather than reflecting substantive representational relations. The book navigates scientific, everyday, and philosophical contexts, showing how content attribution functions as a “gloss” that aids explanation without committing to metaphysical assumptions about representation. While Egan’s approach offers solutions to long-standing debates, it also faces critical tensions regarding the individuation of mental states and the role of the external environment. This review highlights both the originality and the philosophical challenges of Egan’s position, underscoring the book’s contribution to ongoing debates in cognitive science and the philosophy of mind. |
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| ISSN: | 2317-630X |