Complex Dynamic Analysis for Game Model under Different Regulatory Levels in China’s Housing Rental Market
In this paper, we construct an evolutionary game model of government and real estate operators (long-term apartment rental companies) in the housing rental market in the context of financial institutions and public participation in regulation and analyze the effects of different regulatory levels of...
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| Main Authors: | Lingling Mu, Xiangyu Qin, Yuan Li, Ping Liu |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Wiley
2020-01-01
|
| Series: | Complexity |
| Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2020/7370868 |
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