Incentive and Coordination in the Two-Sided Market: Evidence from the P2P Lending Market

Two-sided markets serve as information intermediaries by connecting participants on both sides. In this study, we focus on the coordination of participants in the P2P lending market using a coupon strategy as an incentive to attract investment. Using a two-sided market model, we find that when a pla...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Yingxiu Zhao, Baojuan Shi
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Wiley 2021-01-01
Series:Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society
Online Access:http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/9240374
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Description
Summary:Two-sided markets serve as information intermediaries by connecting participants on both sides. In this study, we focus on the coordination of participants in the P2P lending market using a coupon strategy as an incentive to attract investment. Using a two-sided market model, we find that when a platform adopts the coupon strategy, (i) the platform utility and participants’ utility are both greater and (ii) the number of participants is greater. In addition, as most research on two-sided markets and coupon strategy focuses on theoretical models, our study provides empirical support using data from Renrendai.com over 2018 to 2019.
ISSN:1607-887X