Spillover Effects and the Stability of Cartels

It is widely recognized that competition is the most optimal way to ensure economic efficiency and satisfy consumer needs. However, companies are naturally motivated to gain a monopoly position, as this would increase their profits and lower their marketing expenditure. Competition policy, however,...

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Main Authors: Michał Piętal, Marcin Paszko
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Polish Economic Society 2025-06-01
Series:Ekonomista
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Online Access:https://ekonomista.pte.pl/Spillover-Effects-and-the-Stability-of-Cartels,196231,0,2.html
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author Michał Piętal
Marcin Paszko
author_facet Michał Piętal
Marcin Paszko
author_sort Michał Piętal
collection DOAJ
description It is widely recognized that competition is the most optimal way to ensure economic efficiency and satisfy consumer needs. However, companies are naturally motivated to gain a monopoly position, as this would increase their profits and lower their marketing expenditure. Competition policy, however, is effective in preventing this so long as appropriate regulations are in force when required. If the market is able to ensure competition unaided (e.g. in a perfectly competitive market), government intervention is not only superfluous, but costly and even socially harmful. This paper examines Nash equilibria for the classic Cournot model, as elaborated by Prokop (2011), and extends the results of that paper to cover know-how spillover scenarios. The authors consider sound and novel suggestions concerning cartels in terms of industrial policy on pro-innovation activities. This is because formally stable cartels tend to destabilize in the face of market-related (IP-related) events. The paper introduces, observes and elaborates this phenomenon.
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institution Kabale University
issn 0013-3205
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language English
publishDate 2025-06-01
publisher Polish Economic Society
record_format Article
series Ekonomista
spelling doaj-art-118f89feaf4442caa1a44a16ef7276992025-08-20T03:29:19ZengPolish Economic SocietyEkonomista0013-32052299-61842025-06-01220022010.52335/ekon/196231196231Spillover Effects and the Stability of CartelsMichał Piętal0https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3928-2522Marcin Paszko1https://orcid.org/0009-0005-8460-7487Zakład Systemów Złożonych, Politechnika Rzeszowska im. I. Łukasiewicza, PolskaZakład Systemów Złożonych, Politechnika Rzeszowska im. I. Łukasiewicza, PolskaIt is widely recognized that competition is the most optimal way to ensure economic efficiency and satisfy consumer needs. However, companies are naturally motivated to gain a monopoly position, as this would increase their profits and lower their marketing expenditure. Competition policy, however, is effective in preventing this so long as appropriate regulations are in force when required. If the market is able to ensure competition unaided (e.g. in a perfectly competitive market), government intervention is not only superfluous, but costly and even socially harmful. This paper examines Nash equilibria for the classic Cournot model, as elaborated by Prokop (2011), and extends the results of that paper to cover know-how spillover scenarios. The authors consider sound and novel suggestions concerning cartels in terms of industrial policy on pro-innovation activities. This is because formally stable cartels tend to destabilize in the face of market-related (IP-related) events. The paper introduces, observes and elaborates this phenomenon.https://ekonomista.pte.pl/Spillover-Effects-and-the-Stability-of-Cartels,196231,0,2.htmlnash equilibriumheterogeneous cartels stabilityknow-how flows
spellingShingle Michał Piętal
Marcin Paszko
Spillover Effects and the Stability of Cartels
Ekonomista
nash equilibrium
heterogeneous cartels stability
know-how flows
title Spillover Effects and the Stability of Cartels
title_full Spillover Effects and the Stability of Cartels
title_fullStr Spillover Effects and the Stability of Cartels
title_full_unstemmed Spillover Effects and the Stability of Cartels
title_short Spillover Effects and the Stability of Cartels
title_sort spillover effects and the stability of cartels
topic nash equilibrium
heterogeneous cartels stability
know-how flows
url https://ekonomista.pte.pl/Spillover-Effects-and-the-Stability-of-Cartels,196231,0,2.html
work_keys_str_mv AT michałpietal spillovereffectsandthestabilityofcartels
AT marcinpaszko spillovereffectsandthestabilityofcartels