Philosophical or Empirical Incommensurability of Frequentist Versus Bayesian Thinking

Frequentists and Bayesians disagree about the soundness of performing calculations based, in an important part, on prior information. The disagreement goes back to a basic philosophical disagreement about how to conceptualize the meaning of probability. As frequentists and Bayesians use the term dif...

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Main Author: David Trafimow
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu 2021-01-01
Series:Ekonometria
Online Access:https://journals.ue.wroc.pl/eada/article/view/939
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author David Trafimow
author_facet David Trafimow
author_sort David Trafimow
collection DOAJ
description Frequentists and Bayesians disagree about the soundness of performing calculations based, in an important part, on prior information. The disagreement goes back to a basic philosophical disagreement about how to conceptualize the meaning of probability. As frequentists and Bayesians use the term differently, there is a basic philosophical incommensurability. However, this philosophical incommensurability need not imply an empirical incommensurability. It is possible for there to be, simultaneously, philosophical incommensurability and empirical commensurability. This possibility implies consequences that this article discusses.(original abstract)
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issn 2449-9994
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record_format Article
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spelling doaj-art-0f0966dd89544922855934d4ceb2fde92025-08-20T03:08:21ZengWydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we WrocławiuEkonometria2449-99942021-01-01nr 1940Philosophical or Empirical Incommensurability of Frequentist Versus Bayesian ThinkingDavid Trafimow0New Mexico State University, United StatesFrequentists and Bayesians disagree about the soundness of performing calculations based, in an important part, on prior information. The disagreement goes back to a basic philosophical disagreement about how to conceptualize the meaning of probability. As frequentists and Bayesians use the term differently, there is a basic philosophical incommensurability. However, this philosophical incommensurability need not imply an empirical incommensurability. It is possible for there to be, simultaneously, philosophical incommensurability and empirical commensurability. This possibility implies consequences that this article discusses.(original abstract)https://journals.ue.wroc.pl/eada/article/view/939
spellingShingle David Trafimow
Philosophical or Empirical Incommensurability of Frequentist Versus Bayesian Thinking
Ekonometria
title Philosophical or Empirical Incommensurability of Frequentist Versus Bayesian Thinking
title_full Philosophical or Empirical Incommensurability of Frequentist Versus Bayesian Thinking
title_fullStr Philosophical or Empirical Incommensurability of Frequentist Versus Bayesian Thinking
title_full_unstemmed Philosophical or Empirical Incommensurability of Frequentist Versus Bayesian Thinking
title_short Philosophical or Empirical Incommensurability of Frequentist Versus Bayesian Thinking
title_sort philosophical or empirical incommensurability of frequentist versus bayesian thinking
url https://journals.ue.wroc.pl/eada/article/view/939
work_keys_str_mv AT davidtrafimow philosophicalorempiricalincommensurabilityoffrequentistversusbayesianthinking