La teoría sociológica del derecho europea y las concepciones jurídicas del zapatismo mexicano | The European sociological theory of law and the legal conceptions of the mexican zapatismo
Resumen: Los críticos del positivismo legalista en la transición del siglo XIX al XX -Gény, Ehrlich, Kantorowiz- enfrentaron una concepción plural del derecho a la ley como única fuente formal del derecho y al Estado como una única fuente material del derecho. La semejanza de estos críticos y el de...
Saved in:
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | Spanish |
| Published: |
University of Valencia
2019-06-01
|
| Series: | Cuadernos Electrónicos de Filosofía del Derecho |
| Online Access: | https://turia.uv.es/index.php/CEFD/article/view/13684 |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| Summary: | Resumen: Los críticos del positivismo legalista en la transición del siglo XIX al XX -Gény, Ehrlich, Kantorowiz- enfrentaron una concepción plural del derecho a la ley como única fuente formal del derecho y al Estado como una única fuente material del derecho. La semejanza de estos críticos y el derecho indígena en general -y en particular el derecho indígena zapatista- es asombrosa tanto en lo que respecta a la defensa de una pluralidad de normas como a la génesis y formación histórica de las mismas.
Abstract: The critics of legalistic positivism in the transition from the nineteenth to the twentieth centuries -Gény, Ehrlich, Kantorowiz- were opposed to a plural conception of the law to the law as the only formal source and the state as a only material source of law. The similarity between these critics and indigenous law in general -and indigenous zapatista law in particular- is amazing as much in respect to the defense of a plurality of rules as to their origin and historical development.
ABSTRACT: The critics of legalistic positivism in the transition from the nineteenth to the twentieth centuries -Gény, Ehrlich, Kantorowiz- were opposed to a plural conception of the law to the law as the only formal source and the state as a only material source of law. The similarity between these critics and indigenous law in general -and indigenous zapatista law in particular- is amazing as much in respect to the defense of a plurality of rules as to their origin and historical development.
|
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 1138-9877 |