An Evolutionary Game Analysis on Public Information Communication between the Government and the Public in China
Public information is a social resource that connects all aspects of social life, regulates social activities and public behaviors, and plays a very important role in influencing public trust. Based on the perspective of communication, we divide the government into two ways to release public informa...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Wiley
2021-01-01
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| Series: | Complexity |
| Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/8956704 |
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| _version_ | 1832566387036389376 |
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| author | Hongsen Luo Ying Gao Fulei Shi |
| author_facet | Hongsen Luo Ying Gao Fulei Shi |
| author_sort | Hongsen Luo |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Public information is a social resource that connects all aspects of social life, regulates social activities and public behaviors, and plays a very important role in influencing public trust. Based on the perspective of communication, we divide the government into two ways to release public information, that is, mass communication and personalized recommendation. Moreover, the public can choose to acquire or not acquire a strategy. Then, this study conducts an evolutionary game between the government and the public to analyze the influence of public information on the public in China. Our objective is to find how the evolutionary path changes between the two players when strategies are changing. Then, a simulation analysis is presented in six scenarios to illustrate the results. The results show that the two players can converge to different stable statuses under different situations. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-0cfa91415f2640c79bbda05fceff1653 |
| institution | Kabale University |
| issn | 1076-2787 1099-0526 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2021-01-01 |
| publisher | Wiley |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Complexity |
| spelling | doaj-art-0cfa91415f2640c79bbda05fceff16532025-02-03T01:04:09ZengWileyComplexity1076-27871099-05262021-01-01202110.1155/2021/89567048956704An Evolutionary Game Analysis on Public Information Communication between the Government and the Public in ChinaHongsen Luo0Ying Gao1Fulei Shi2School of Management and Engineering, Capital University of Economics and Business, Beijing, ChinaSchool of Management and Engineering, Capital University of Economics and Business, Beijing, ChinaSchool of Management and Engineering, Capital University of Economics and Business, Beijing, ChinaPublic information is a social resource that connects all aspects of social life, regulates social activities and public behaviors, and plays a very important role in influencing public trust. Based on the perspective of communication, we divide the government into two ways to release public information, that is, mass communication and personalized recommendation. Moreover, the public can choose to acquire or not acquire a strategy. Then, this study conducts an evolutionary game between the government and the public to analyze the influence of public information on the public in China. Our objective is to find how the evolutionary path changes between the two players when strategies are changing. Then, a simulation analysis is presented in six scenarios to illustrate the results. The results show that the two players can converge to different stable statuses under different situations.http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/8956704 |
| spellingShingle | Hongsen Luo Ying Gao Fulei Shi An Evolutionary Game Analysis on Public Information Communication between the Government and the Public in China Complexity |
| title | An Evolutionary Game Analysis on Public Information Communication between the Government and the Public in China |
| title_full | An Evolutionary Game Analysis on Public Information Communication between the Government and the Public in China |
| title_fullStr | An Evolutionary Game Analysis on Public Information Communication between the Government and the Public in China |
| title_full_unstemmed | An Evolutionary Game Analysis on Public Information Communication between the Government and the Public in China |
| title_short | An Evolutionary Game Analysis on Public Information Communication between the Government and the Public in China |
| title_sort | evolutionary game analysis on public information communication between the government and the public in china |
| url | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/8956704 |
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