THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CONUNDRUM: PERSPECTIVES FROM DANTE’S “INFERNO”
The Corporate Governance Conundrum: Perspectives from Dante’s Inferno. Corporate sustainability reporting, renowned as an instrument for businesses to communicate how they function more efficiently and responsibly within the social and physical environment, while simultaneously remaining profitable...
Saved in:
| Main Authors: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | deu |
| Published: |
Babeș-Bolyai University
2016-12-01
|
| Series: | Studia Universitatis Babeș-Bolyai. Philosophia |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://studia.reviste.ubbcluj.ro/index.php/subbphilosophia/article/view/5273 |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| Summary: | The Corporate Governance Conundrum: Perspectives from Dante’s Inferno. Corporate sustainability reporting, renowned as an instrument for businesses to communicate how they function more efficiently and responsibly within the social and physical environment, while simultaneously remaining profitable, has evolved in an up-and-coming trend by businesses. Recent corporate history saw much contrast in ethical behaviour in the global corporate environment. On the one hand, Dante’s deadly sin of avarice was running amok, which resulted in spectacular corporate demises. On the other hand, there was the rise of the concept of sustainable development, which describes an organisational culture change aiming to ensure that routine business decisions are made within an economically, socially and environmentally responsible framework. However, given the realities of the modern business environment, intangible ethical philosophies and lip-service codes of ethical conduct may often not be sufficient to ensure responsible and sustainable corporate, environmental and social development. This article reflects on how corporate sin potentially contributes to the contemporary corporate governance conundrum as well as on whether ethics codes can change ethical behaviour.
|
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 2065-9407 |