Blinding HT: Hiding Hardware Trojan signals traced across multiple sequential levels

Abstract Modern electronic systems usually use third‐party IP cores to build basic blocks. However, there may be Hardware Trojans (HTs) in IP cores, which will cause critical security problem. There are already many HT detection methods which claim to detect all publicly available HT benchmarks. But...

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Main Authors: Ying Zhang, Minghui Ge, Xin Chen, Jiaqi Yao, Zhiming Mao
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Wiley 2022-01-01
Series:IET Circuits, Devices and Systems
Subjects:
Online Access:https://doi.org/10.1049/cds2.12088
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author Ying Zhang
Minghui Ge
Xin Chen
Jiaqi Yao
Zhiming Mao
author_facet Ying Zhang
Minghui Ge
Xin Chen
Jiaqi Yao
Zhiming Mao
author_sort Ying Zhang
collection DOAJ
description Abstract Modern electronic systems usually use third‐party IP cores to build basic blocks. However, there may be Hardware Trojans (HTs) in IP cores, which will cause critical security problem. There are already many HT detection methods which claim to detect all publicly available HT benchmarks. But these methods can still be defeated by designing novel HTs. In this article, a method called Blinding HT is proposed, which camouflages itself as a normal circuit and is difficult to be triggered. The Blinding HT hides input signals of HT modules by tracing across multiple sequential levels. This method increases the influence of HT trigger inputs on output signals, so that trigger inputs are not be identified as redundant inputs. In this way, this approach can defeat the detection methods which identify weakly affecting trigger inputs and redundant trigger inputs across multiple sequential levels. As shown in the experimental results, the proposed HTs are hardly detected even by the novel HT detection approach based on machine learning algorithm. These HTs have small footprints on the design in terms of area and power to resist the side‐channel effect analysis. The proposed HT has stealthiness, general applicability and imperceptibility.
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institution Kabale University
issn 1751-858X
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language English
publishDate 2022-01-01
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record_format Article
series IET Circuits, Devices and Systems
spelling doaj-art-0b7c6a57ea884574bc07d9009053335b2025-02-03T06:47:11ZengWileyIET Circuits, Devices and Systems1751-858X1751-85982022-01-0116110511510.1049/cds2.12088Blinding HT: Hiding Hardware Trojan signals traced across multiple sequential levelsYing Zhang0Minghui Ge1Xin Chen2Jiaqi Yao3Zhiming Mao4College of Electronic and Information Engineering Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics Nanjing ChinaCollege of Electronic and Information Engineering Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics Nanjing ChinaCollege of Electronic and Information Engineering Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics Nanjing ChinaCollege of Electronic and Information Engineering Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics Nanjing ChinaCollege of Electronic and Information Engineering Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics Nanjing ChinaAbstract Modern electronic systems usually use third‐party IP cores to build basic blocks. However, there may be Hardware Trojans (HTs) in IP cores, which will cause critical security problem. There are already many HT detection methods which claim to detect all publicly available HT benchmarks. But these methods can still be defeated by designing novel HTs. In this article, a method called Blinding HT is proposed, which camouflages itself as a normal circuit and is difficult to be triggered. The Blinding HT hides input signals of HT modules by tracing across multiple sequential levels. This method increases the influence of HT trigger inputs on output signals, so that trigger inputs are not be identified as redundant inputs. In this way, this approach can defeat the detection methods which identify weakly affecting trigger inputs and redundant trigger inputs across multiple sequential levels. As shown in the experimental results, the proposed HTs are hardly detected even by the novel HT detection approach based on machine learning algorithm. These HTs have small footprints on the design in terms of area and power to resist the side‐channel effect analysis. The proposed HT has stealthiness, general applicability and imperceptibility.https://doi.org/10.1049/cds2.12088integrated circuit designfield programmable gate arraysinvasive software
spellingShingle Ying Zhang
Minghui Ge
Xin Chen
Jiaqi Yao
Zhiming Mao
Blinding HT: Hiding Hardware Trojan signals traced across multiple sequential levels
IET Circuits, Devices and Systems
integrated circuit design
field programmable gate arrays
invasive software
title Blinding HT: Hiding Hardware Trojan signals traced across multiple sequential levels
title_full Blinding HT: Hiding Hardware Trojan signals traced across multiple sequential levels
title_fullStr Blinding HT: Hiding Hardware Trojan signals traced across multiple sequential levels
title_full_unstemmed Blinding HT: Hiding Hardware Trojan signals traced across multiple sequential levels
title_short Blinding HT: Hiding Hardware Trojan signals traced across multiple sequential levels
title_sort blinding ht hiding hardware trojan signals traced across multiple sequential levels
topic integrated circuit design
field programmable gate arrays
invasive software
url https://doi.org/10.1049/cds2.12088
work_keys_str_mv AT yingzhang blindinghthidinghardwaretrojansignalstracedacrossmultiplesequentiallevels
AT minghuige blindinghthidinghardwaretrojansignalstracedacrossmultiplesequentiallevels
AT xinchen blindinghthidinghardwaretrojansignalstracedacrossmultiplesequentiallevels
AT jiaqiyao blindinghthidinghardwaretrojansignalstracedacrossmultiplesequentiallevels
AT zhimingmao blindinghthidinghardwaretrojansignalstracedacrossmultiplesequentiallevels