Referring to Nothing
Typical accounts of reference demand that referring terms denote existent objects. This assumption is shared by theories across a variety of areas of philosophy, in particular, direct reference views in philosophy of language; neo-Fregean conceptions in the philosophy of mathematics, and easy-ontolo...
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| Main Author: | Otávio Bueno |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina
2024-10-01
|
| Series: | Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/102776 |
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