Moral Development, Repentance, and Self-Affirmation
This article engages closely with David Owen’s ‘Autonomy, Self-Respect, and Self-Love: Nietzsche on Ethical Agency.’ Owen argues that Kant tried, but ultimately failed, to resolve the tension between law and love that is characteristic of European modern philosophy. This is because Kant takes a ‘hig...
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he Keele-Oxford-St Andrews Kantian Research Centre (University of Keele)
2023-12-01
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| Series: | Public Reason |
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| Online Access: | https://www.publicreason.ro/pdfa/171 |
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| author | Paula Satne |
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| description | This article engages closely with David Owen’s ‘Autonomy, Self-Respect, and Self-Love: Nietzsche on Ethical Agency.’ Owen argues that Kant tried, but ultimately failed, to resolve the tension between law and love that is characteristic of European modern philosophy. This is because Kant takes a ‘highly critical stance to self-love throughout his moral philosophy’ since he conflates self-love with psychological egoism and sees it as ‘opposed to morality as a threat, a challenge, a danger…’ Owen articulates Nietzsche’s main objections to the Kantian opposition between self-love and the moral law and argues that Nietzsche has a rather greater claim than Kant to have resolved this tension. In this article, I explore whether some of the arguments developed in Owen’s text represent serious challenges to Kant’s position and develop a reading of Kant’s ethics which can answer most of the challenges. First, I argue that Kant is committed to a version of the ‘agency free will’ model. I show that, on the Kantian model, one constitutes oneself as self by becoming what one is through reflecting about one’s ability to live up to what one considers one’s fundamental commitments. Second, I argue that on this model, there is no universal list of maxims or commitments that can be fully specified in advance for all agents in all times. Each person’s project of moral transformation is personal and ultimately shaped by features of their own psychology and personal history as well as features of their social circumstances. Third, I argue that the Kantian project of moral transformation, which involves repenting immoral maxims, can also be understood as a form of flourishing and self-affirmation, which includes the pursuit of happiness as one of its components. On this reading, far from endorsing an ‘ascetic ideal’ of the moral agent, Kant embraces an ideal of the human life in which there is significant space, and even a duty, to pursue pleasurable endeavours. However, although morality and happiness are not intrinsically incompatible, they are likely to conflict under unstable and unjust external conditions. Thus, the extent to which we can live a completely morally good life is not independent of social and political conditions. Ultimately, in the Kantian picture, the task of moral self-improvement also has a social dimension: we must avoid being complicit with the injustices of our time and instead work towards overturning them. It is in fair (or at least fairer) social and political conditions that we can pursue both moral and personal ends and flourish. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-073b993e01864cf2bd5b6eafb8f12c2f |
| institution | DOAJ |
| issn | 2065-7285 2065-8958 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2023-12-01 |
| publisher | he Keele-Oxford-St Andrews Kantian Research Centre (University of Keele) |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Public Reason |
| spelling | doaj-art-073b993e01864cf2bd5b6eafb8f12c2f2025-08-20T03:13:11Zenghe Keele-Oxford-St Andrews Kantian Research Centre (University of Keele)Public Reason2065-72852065-89582023-12-0114(2)-15(1)14(2)-15(1)3556Moral Development, Repentance, and Self-Affirmation Paula Satne0University of Leeds This article engages closely with David Owen’s ‘Autonomy, Self-Respect, and Self-Love: Nietzsche on Ethical Agency.’ Owen argues that Kant tried, but ultimately failed, to resolve the tension between law and love that is characteristic of European modern philosophy. This is because Kant takes a ‘highly critical stance to self-love throughout his moral philosophy’ since he conflates self-love with psychological egoism and sees it as ‘opposed to morality as a threat, a challenge, a danger…’ Owen articulates Nietzsche’s main objections to the Kantian opposition between self-love and the moral law and argues that Nietzsche has a rather greater claim than Kant to have resolved this tension. In this article, I explore whether some of the arguments developed in Owen’s text represent serious challenges to Kant’s position and develop a reading of Kant’s ethics which can answer most of the challenges. First, I argue that Kant is committed to a version of the ‘agency free will’ model. I show that, on the Kantian model, one constitutes oneself as self by becoming what one is through reflecting about one’s ability to live up to what one considers one’s fundamental commitments. Second, I argue that on this model, there is no universal list of maxims or commitments that can be fully specified in advance for all agents in all times. Each person’s project of moral transformation is personal and ultimately shaped by features of their own psychology and personal history as well as features of their social circumstances. Third, I argue that the Kantian project of moral transformation, which involves repenting immoral maxims, can also be understood as a form of flourishing and self-affirmation, which includes the pursuit of happiness as one of its components. On this reading, far from endorsing an ‘ascetic ideal’ of the moral agent, Kant embraces an ideal of the human life in which there is significant space, and even a duty, to pursue pleasurable endeavours. However, although morality and happiness are not intrinsically incompatible, they are likely to conflict under unstable and unjust external conditions. Thus, the extent to which we can live a completely morally good life is not independent of social and political conditions. Ultimately, in the Kantian picture, the task of moral self-improvement also has a social dimension: we must avoid being complicit with the injustices of our time and instead work towards overturning them. It is in fair (or at least fairer) social and political conditions that we can pursue both moral and personal ends and flourish.https://www.publicreason.ro/pdfa/171moral developmentrepentanceself-affirmationmoral transformationkantian forgivenesshappinessflourishingguiltradical evilkantnietzscheethical and moral agency. |
| spellingShingle | Paula Satne Moral Development, Repentance, and Self-Affirmation Public Reason moral development repentance self-affirmation moral transformation kantian forgiveness happiness flourishing guilt radical evil kant nietzsche ethical and moral agency. |
| title | Moral Development, Repentance, and Self-Affirmation |
| title_full | Moral Development, Repentance, and Self-Affirmation |
| title_fullStr | Moral Development, Repentance, and Self-Affirmation |
| title_full_unstemmed | Moral Development, Repentance, and Self-Affirmation |
| title_short | Moral Development, Repentance, and Self-Affirmation |
| title_sort | moral development repentance and self affirmation |
| topic | moral development repentance self-affirmation moral transformation kantian forgiveness happiness flourishing guilt radical evil kant nietzsche ethical and moral agency. |
| url | https://www.publicreason.ro/pdfa/171 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT paulasatne moraldevelopmentrepentanceandselfaffirmation |