A review on the strategy equilibrium stability analysis of demand-side participation in the electricity market from an evolutionary game perspective
With the increasing penetration of renewable energy sources, there has been a profound structural transformation in electricity markets, particularly in the operational paradigm where demand-side resources participate in market mechanisms. This evolution underscores the critical role of demand-side...
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| Format: | Article |
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Editorial Department of Electric Power Engineering Technology
2025-05-01
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| Series: | 电力工程技术 |
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| Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.12158/j.2096-3203.2025.03.001 |
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| author | Lefeng CHENG Tao ZOU Manqi NI Aoli CHEN Jian DONG Jizhong ZHU |
| author_facet | Lefeng CHENG Tao ZOU Manqi NI Aoli CHEN Jian DONG Jizhong ZHU |
| author_sort | Lefeng CHENG |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | With the increasing penetration of renewable energy sources, there has been a profound structural transformation in electricity markets, particularly in the operational paradigm where demand-side resources participate in market mechanisms. This evolution underscores the critical role of demand-side flexibility in enhancing grid resilience and accelerating low-carbon transition pathways. The traditional supply-side regulation is gradually shifting towards a multi-agent decision-making model dominated by demand-side management, involving complex interactions among government, electricity suppliers, grid operators, and consumers. Evolutionary game theory (EGT), as an important tool for studying multi-agent dynamic games and strategy evolution, demonstrates unique advantages in analyzing demand-side participation in the electricity market. Unlike traditional game theory, EGT accounts for bounded rationality, incomplete information, and dynamic strategy adaptation, enabling effective analysis of market equilibrium and stability under different incentives and policy frameworks. A comprehensive review of the applications of EGT in the electricity market is provided in this paper, focusing on the strategy evolution and equilibrium mechanisms of demand-side participation. It explores how EGT helps to understand and predict strategy adjustments and the impact of policy incentives on market stability in multi-agent games. The paper also looks forward to future research directions. By organizing and analyzing the existing literature, this review offers a theoretical framework and practical reference for policymakers, market regulators, and researchers to facilitate the collaborative evolution and sustainable development of the electricity market under the context of renewable energy. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-03edb8321d2e49f6bc0a6a5194f83206 |
| institution | DOAJ |
| issn | 2096-3203 |
| language | zho |
| publishDate | 2025-05-01 |
| publisher | Editorial Department of Electric Power Engineering Technology |
| record_format | Article |
| series | 电力工程技术 |
| spelling | doaj-art-03edb8321d2e49f6bc0a6a5194f832062025-08-20T03:19:17ZzhoEditorial Department of Electric Power Engineering Technology电力工程技术2096-32032025-05-0144331710.12158/j.2096-3203.2025.03.001chenglefengA review on the strategy equilibrium stability analysis of demand-side participation in the electricity market from an evolutionary game perspectiveLefeng CHENG0Tao ZOU1Manqi NI2Aoli CHEN3Jian DONG4Jizhong ZHU5School of Mechanical and Electrical Engineering, Guangzhou University, Guangzhou 510006, ChinaSchool of Mechanical and Electrical Engineering, Guangzhou University, Guangzhou 510006, ChinaSchool of Mechanical and Electrical Engineering, Guangzhou University, Guangzhou 510006, ChinaSchool of Mechanical and Electrical Engineering, Guangzhou University, Guangzhou 510006, ChinaSchool of Mechanical and Electrical Engineering, Guangzhou University, Guangzhou 510006, ChinaSchool of Electric Power, South China University of Technology, Guangzhou 510641, ChinaWith the increasing penetration of renewable energy sources, there has been a profound structural transformation in electricity markets, particularly in the operational paradigm where demand-side resources participate in market mechanisms. This evolution underscores the critical role of demand-side flexibility in enhancing grid resilience and accelerating low-carbon transition pathways. The traditional supply-side regulation is gradually shifting towards a multi-agent decision-making model dominated by demand-side management, involving complex interactions among government, electricity suppliers, grid operators, and consumers. Evolutionary game theory (EGT), as an important tool for studying multi-agent dynamic games and strategy evolution, demonstrates unique advantages in analyzing demand-side participation in the electricity market. Unlike traditional game theory, EGT accounts for bounded rationality, incomplete information, and dynamic strategy adaptation, enabling effective analysis of market equilibrium and stability under different incentives and policy frameworks. A comprehensive review of the applications of EGT in the electricity market is provided in this paper, focusing on the strategy evolution and equilibrium mechanisms of demand-side participation. It explores how EGT helps to understand and predict strategy adjustments and the impact of policy incentives on market stability in multi-agent games. The paper also looks forward to future research directions. By organizing and analyzing the existing literature, this review offers a theoretical framework and practical reference for policymakers, market regulators, and researchers to facilitate the collaborative evolution and sustainable development of the electricity market under the context of renewable energy.https://doi.org/10.12158/j.2096-3203.2025.03.001evolutionary game theory (egt)demand sidepower marketstrategy evolutionmarket equilibriumpolicy incentives |
| spellingShingle | Lefeng CHENG Tao ZOU Manqi NI Aoli CHEN Jian DONG Jizhong ZHU A review on the strategy equilibrium stability analysis of demand-side participation in the electricity market from an evolutionary game perspective 电力工程技术 evolutionary game theory (egt) demand side power market strategy evolution market equilibrium policy incentives |
| title | A review on the strategy equilibrium stability analysis of demand-side participation in the electricity market from an evolutionary game perspective |
| title_full | A review on the strategy equilibrium stability analysis of demand-side participation in the electricity market from an evolutionary game perspective |
| title_fullStr | A review on the strategy equilibrium stability analysis of demand-side participation in the electricity market from an evolutionary game perspective |
| title_full_unstemmed | A review on the strategy equilibrium stability analysis of demand-side participation in the electricity market from an evolutionary game perspective |
| title_short | A review on the strategy equilibrium stability analysis of demand-side participation in the electricity market from an evolutionary game perspective |
| title_sort | review on the strategy equilibrium stability analysis of demand side participation in the electricity market from an evolutionary game perspective |
| topic | evolutionary game theory (egt) demand side power market strategy evolution market equilibrium policy incentives |
| url | https://doi.org/10.12158/j.2096-3203.2025.03.001 |
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