Causal Deviance in Brain–Computer Interfaces (BCIs): A Challenge for the Philosophy of Action
The problem of deviant causal chains is a classic challenge in the philosophy of action. According to the causal theory of action (CTA), an event qualifies as an action if it is caused by the agent’s intention. In cases of deviant causal chains, this condition is met, but the agent loses control of...
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MDPI AG
2025-03-01
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| Series: | Philosophies |
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| author | Artem S. Yashin |
| author_facet | Artem S. Yashin |
| author_sort | Artem S. Yashin |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | The problem of deviant causal chains is a classic challenge in the philosophy of action. According to the causal theory of action (CTA), an event qualifies as an action if it is caused by the agent’s intention. In cases of deviant causal chains, this condition is met, but the agent loses control of the situation. To address this, theorists suggest that the intention must cause the action “in the right way”. However, defining what constitutes the “right way” is difficult, as the distinction between having and not having control can be subtle. In this paper, I demonstrate that brain-computer interfaces (BCIs) provide important insights into basic causal deviance. I examine how existing strategies might account for deviant causation in BCI use and highlight their challenges. I advocate for reliability strategies—approaches that focus on identifying which causal pathways reliably connect an agent’s intentions to their outcomes. Additionally, I compare two BCIs that differ in their sources of occasional malfunction. I argue that the presence of causal deviance in a given case depends on the boundaries of the system that enables action. Such boundary analysis is unnecessary for bodily movements; however, for basic actions performed through a machine, it becomes essential. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-008f4eb2efc64a469e20c094d31967f5 |
| institution | OA Journals |
| issn | 2409-9287 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2025-03-01 |
| publisher | MDPI AG |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Philosophies |
| spelling | doaj-art-008f4eb2efc64a469e20c094d31967f52025-08-20T02:18:20ZengMDPI AGPhilosophies2409-92872025-03-011023710.3390/philosophies10020037Causal Deviance in Brain–Computer Interfaces (BCIs): A Challenge for the Philosophy of ActionArtem S. Yashin0MEG Center, Moscow State University of Psychology and Education, 127051 Moscow, RussiaThe problem of deviant causal chains is a classic challenge in the philosophy of action. According to the causal theory of action (CTA), an event qualifies as an action if it is caused by the agent’s intention. In cases of deviant causal chains, this condition is met, but the agent loses control of the situation. To address this, theorists suggest that the intention must cause the action “in the right way”. However, defining what constitutes the “right way” is difficult, as the distinction between having and not having control can be subtle. In this paper, I demonstrate that brain-computer interfaces (BCIs) provide important insights into basic causal deviance. I examine how existing strategies might account for deviant causation in BCI use and highlight their challenges. I advocate for reliability strategies—approaches that focus on identifying which causal pathways reliably connect an agent’s intentions to their outcomes. Additionally, I compare two BCIs that differ in their sources of occasional malfunction. I argue that the presence of causal deviance in a given case depends on the boundaries of the system that enables action. Such boundary analysis is unnecessary for bodily movements; however, for basic actions performed through a machine, it becomes essential.https://www.mdpi.com/2409-9287/10/2/37philosophy of actionagencycausal theory of actiondeviant causal chainsbrain-computer interfacehybrid brain-computer interface |
| spellingShingle | Artem S. Yashin Causal Deviance in Brain–Computer Interfaces (BCIs): A Challenge for the Philosophy of Action Philosophies philosophy of action agency causal theory of action deviant causal chains brain-computer interface hybrid brain-computer interface |
| title | Causal Deviance in Brain–Computer Interfaces (BCIs): A Challenge for the Philosophy of Action |
| title_full | Causal Deviance in Brain–Computer Interfaces (BCIs): A Challenge for the Philosophy of Action |
| title_fullStr | Causal Deviance in Brain–Computer Interfaces (BCIs): A Challenge for the Philosophy of Action |
| title_full_unstemmed | Causal Deviance in Brain–Computer Interfaces (BCIs): A Challenge for the Philosophy of Action |
| title_short | Causal Deviance in Brain–Computer Interfaces (BCIs): A Challenge for the Philosophy of Action |
| title_sort | causal deviance in brain computer interfaces bcis a challenge for the philosophy of action |
| topic | philosophy of action agency causal theory of action deviant causal chains brain-computer interface hybrid brain-computer interface |
| url | https://www.mdpi.com/2409-9287/10/2/37 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT artemsyashin causaldevianceinbraincomputerinterfacesbcisachallengeforthephilosophyofaction |